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Abstract 
 
Within the policy mix, policy instruments are developed for complimentary purposes 
where possible interactions can take place. Research has shown that renewable energy 
support policies on a national level and carbon dioxide emission trading systems on a 
supranational level can cause negative interaction effects due to the connection through 
their carbon dioxide component. This problem has been stated to need more empirical 
research and very few country specific studies have been made to analyze the 
understanding of the effects and whether this is indeed a problem or not. 
   The purpose of the study is to examine the perceptions of the interaction between the 
Swedish Electricity Certificate System (ECS) and the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) from a Swedish perspective. The study’s inductive approach 
generates a theoretical framework for how this specific interaction can be understood 
and how policy interactions in general can be understood. A qualitative design was 
adopted through semi-structured interviews with relevant actors within Sweden to 
gather the data for the empirical findings. 
   The results indicate various understandings of the interaction which conforms into two 
factions; one faction sees the interaction as a non-problem due to the uncertain 
magnitude of the interaction effect and due to the notion that the ECS is not a climate 
instrument; whilst the other faction maintains that the interaction is a problem since the 
ECS is inherently interlinked with carbon dioxide emissions and thus functions partly as 
a climate policy, and will therefore increase the costs of carbon dioxide emission cuts 
due to locked-in measures.  
   The results furthermore demonstrate theoretical developments that show multiple 
policy-level notions and overlapping policy purposes that may explain the interaction 
and its components which lastly conclude in policy recommendations on the matter. 
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I–Introduction  
Policy instruments are widely employed for different reasons across all fields of governance 
and government. Described as a means through “which governments seek to influence citizen 
behavior and achieve policy purposes” (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, p. 511) policy instruments 
enable or disable the ability to do things one way rather than the other (Schneider & Ingram, 
1990, p. 510). Scholars have generally described and studied policy instruments through 
several perspectives and to date there are various ways of conceptualizing instruments and 
their design (e.g., Vedung, 1998; Salamon, 2002; Eliadis, Hill & Howlett, 2005). Market-
based policy instruments in particular have become increasingly popular over the last three 
decades (Mason & Muller, 2007, p. 81). These instruments encourage behavior through 
“market signals rather than through explicit directives” (Stavins, 2001, p. 1) and can be 
thought of as ‘new’ types of instruments that are assumed to offer “less interventionist forms 
of public regulation” (Lascoumes & Le Galès, 2007, p. 13; Jordan, Wurzel & Zito, 2005). 
   Initially referred to as a novelty when combining monetary and fiscal policies, the issuing of 
several types of policy instruments in certain policy spaces has been known as the policy mix 
(Brunner & Meltzer, 1997, p. 69). This policy mix concept implies that the combination of 
policy instruments interacts and creates a more significant effect than the instruments would 
have had if otherwise acting in isolation.  The notion of an effective policy mix however is 
harder to determine, and the implication might be a decrease in overall performance of the 
policy mix if negative interactions take place. Especially climate policies have been known to 
be affected by interactions, where the instruments are seldom applied in complete isolation 
since they encompass so many different policy areas such environment, agriculture, transport 
and energy (Gupta et al., 2007, p. 753).  
   Two market-based instruments that encompass both climate and energy are the Emissions 
Trading System (ETS) – a carbon dioxide emissions reduction instrument – and the Tradable 
Green Certificate (TGC) – a renewable energy promotion instrument. Since energy and 
climate policies are inherently interlinked, multiple instruments have been implemented 
simultaneously within energy, climate and environment policy fields at national and 
supranational levels (Kautto, Arasto, Sijm & Peck, 2012, pp. 117–118). Notions of that the 
policy space has become increasingly congested have risen where too crowded policy fields 
with multiple instruments can cause interaction problems when renewable promotion schemes 
and carbon reduction policies are combined (Linares, Santos & Vantosa, 2007; Kautto et al., 
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p. 118). These simultaneous adoptions have sparked concerns of overlapping goals that can 
cause conflictions and negative synergies (e.g., Oikonomou & Jepma, 2008; Sorrell, 2003a; 
Sorrell & Sijm, 2003; del Río, 2006).  
   In the European Union (EU), the introduction of climate policies and policies that promote 
renewable energy sources has been on the agenda since the 1950s; and in March 2007 the 
European Council adopted a combined energy and climate package, the Europe 2020
1
 strategy 
(European Council, 2007; Swedish Government, 2009a, p. 18; European Commission, 2010, 
p. 2; Jordan, Huitema, van Asselt, Rayner, & Berkhout, 2010). Supranational policies enable 
or disable Member States on the national level to perform in a certain way to reach the targets 
set up by the EU. In terms of climate change mitigation, renewable energy sources have the 
potential to greatly reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions – mainly carbon dioxide – 
associated with electricity production and are thought to contribute towards sustainability 
(Haas, 2001, p. 5). The importance placed on renewable energy to mitigate climate change, 
improve energy security and increase local industrial employment and industry opportunities 
has been highlighted in the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU’s Renewables Directive and by 
national Member State policies (European Commission, 2008a; European Commission, 
2008b; European Union, 2009a; Jordan et al., p. 103). 
   On the renewable energy side, TGC systems have been widely introduced throughout 
several countries within the European Union (del Río, 2006, pp. 1363–1364). The TGC is a 
system that aims to introduce market competition into a production of electricity for 
“technologies that are not fully competitive with traditional supply systems” (Meyer, 2003, p. 
669). The TGCs create a certificate for the producing unit which can be sold on a separate 
market, and thus the producer of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) obtains 
extra revenue aside from the normal sale of electricity. The demand for the TGCs originates 
from a statutory obligation put on the electricity consumers or providers (del Río, 2006, p. 
1366). This policy has yet solely been adopted by individual Member States within the 
European Union, and is thus exclusively functioning on a national level.  
   As a pure climate instrument to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions, the European Union 
adopted a form of emissions trading system, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS), which came into force in 2005. Also called cap-and-trade; the system puts a price 
on emissions by setting an overall ceiling on the total emissions allowed, and creates a market 
where the emission allowances can be traded amongst the covered entities. Since the total cap 
                                                          
1
 20% increased renewable energy, 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions and 20% increased energy 
efficiency to year 2020. 
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is purported to be lower than the otherwise total emissions, the covered entities will have to 
lower their emissions, for example by investing in carbon dioxide reducing technologies or by 
buying emission allowances from other entities that need not use all of theirs. This is thought 
to create a cost-effective way of reducing total carbon dioxide emissions since the emission 
cuts are made where the conditions are most cost-favorable (Jordan et al., 2010, pp. 125–126). 
The EU ETS is the first cap-and-trade program covering more than one country (European 
Commission, 2010, para. 1), and the decision mandate is set at the EU level; the supranational 
level.  
   This two-level framework design of national and supranational policy instruments can 
however cause unwanted problems, and there is a possibility of unintentional effects due to 
the interaction of the two instruments. A theoretical problem is revealed when looking at 
research on the interaction of different policy instruments, and in particular the example of 
renewable energy source promotion instruments coupled with emission trading system 
instruments. Concerns have been raised by scientific and theoretical scholars on the 
implications of the interaction of divergent supranational and national policies, where some 
denote, for example, that TGCs would act as a complement to the EU ETS since the EU ETS 
is technology-neutral and instead provides an incentive for low-cost abatement technologies 
(Brick & Visser, 2009, p. 13). Others have, on the other hand, noted that the coexistence 
causes a complex interaction that can induce conflicts and synergies in both positive and 
negative ways which will affect the policy output (del Río, 2006, p. 1364). In addition, the 
interactions between carbon dioxide policies and renewable policies have been proven to 
drive up costs for reducing carbon dioxide emissions (Anandarajah & Strachan, 2010, p. 
6734). Studies have shown that “this is an under searched field concerning theoretical analysis 
and even more so regarding empirical studies” (del Río, 2006, p. 1388) and that there is a lack 
of empirical studies on the “interaction in different national settings” (del Río, 2006, pp. 1364, 
1387–1388). Moreover, Widerberg believes that “more research within this area, both 
theoretical and empirical” (Widerberg, 2011, p. 16) is needed, and other studies of the 
interaction reach an overall consensus in that more empirical research is desired on the matter 
(e.g., Sorrell, 2003a; Sorrell & Sijm, 2003; Oikonomou & Jepma, 2008; Kautto et al., 2012).  
   This thesis focuses on the Swedish perspective of the interaction between the Swedish 
Electricity Certificate System (ECS), a form of TGC, and the EU ETS. By developing a 
policy instrument perspective on the issue of how national support policies for renewable 
energy can interact with supranational policies of carbon dioxide emission trading systems, 
this study approaches this problem through an inductive approach. Since the empirical 
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research is limited, and the theoretical frameworks of national and supranational policy 
interplay are not yet fully developed, this inductive approach was chosen to move further on 
within the field and try to fill an apparent research gap. In order to understand underlying 
structures of policy instrument interplay, this thesis draws upon the specific case of the 
interaction and tries to generalize the empirical findings into relevant theory that might, after 
rigorous testing and further developments, be applied on other policy interactions.  
   Four central concepts
2
 are developed and derived from the problem framing and previous 
research which will permeate the structure throughout the thesis. This study examines the 
interaction problem from the Swedish perspective and seeks to clarify how it is perceived and 
why there are so many different understandings of the effects of the interaction by using a 
qualitative study design where relevant actors were interviewed to collect the needed data.  
 
 
I.I–Organization of thesis 
The ensuing disposition of the study is as follows; after this introduction chapter, the second 
chapter will frame the problem to better understand the components and the relevant Swedish 
perspective. In addition, the chapter will examine previous research on the ECS and the EU 
ETS eliciting the purpose of the study and subsequent research questions. Lastly, the ECS and 
the EU ETS are explained in more detail to enhance the understanding of the two instruments 
that will result into the central concepts of the thesis, derived from the former parts in the 
same chapter. The third chapter outlines the design of the study and discusses methodological 
considerations worth mentioning in qualitative research, as well as providing information 
about the data collection and management, and the selection and delimitation processes. 
   The fourth chapter presents the empirical findings in a neutral way where the results are 
presented under each representing central concepts category. Chapter five analyzes the 
findings based upon the central concepts and the purpose, where the research questions are 
answered based upon the earlier analysis. The sixth chapter will develop a theoretical 
framework derived from the empirical findings and the analysis, where theoretical 
conceptions are made of the relevant results. The last and subsequent chapter will conclude 
the most important findings in the study and summarize noteworthy results that can contribute 
to further discussion and research on interacting policy instruments.    
                                                          
2
 The concepts; perception of problem; effectiveness; national sovereignty, and; harmonization & coordination, 
will be described more in-depth in chapter II.VI–Central concepts, see page 20.  
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II–Problem framing 
The increased usage and production of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) are 
associated with several benefits, such as climate change mitigation – due to reduced emissions 
of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere –, improved energy security, enhanced local tax 
revenues as well as increased local employment (Haas, 2001, p. 5; Philibert, 2011, p. 9). 
However, the chief reason for adopting measures to increase the share of renewable electricity 
in the energy mix seems to be the carbon dioxide emission reductions that it is thought to 
induce in the “fight against climate change” (Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2009, p. 3). Different 
support schemes have been adopted in order to increase the share of renewable electricity and 
to speed up the transition to a more renewables-based society.  
   The Swedish Electricity Certificate System (ECS) is one way of encouraging additional 
production of RES-E. As seen by most of the simulations of future energy scenarios, the 
increase of energy from renewable sources plays a big part in reaching climate goals and a 
carbon-neutral society (e.g., European Commission, 2011a; Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2012; Gustavsson, Särnholm, Stigsson & Zetterberg, 2011).  
   In 2009 the Swedish Government issued a joint energy-and-climate bill that highlights the 
interconnection between climate goal fulfillment and sound energy policies (Swedish 
Government, 2009a; Swedish Government, 2009b) in order to move away from fossil-energy 
dependency and thus to forcibly reduce the negative impact of climate change (Swedish 
Government Offices, 2009, p. 1). The ECS is part of the bill on energy issues, where it is 
stated that the instruments present a quick way out of the fossil-society with sharp decreases 
in carbon dioxide emissions and that further promotion of production of renewable electricity 
is imperative to reach the climate change goals (Swedish Government, 2009a, p. 9).  
   The ECS, first adopted in January 2003, is a form of a Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) 
and creates a tool for spurring on the production of RES-E. The system is a market-based 
policy instrument that entitles producers of electricity from renewable sources one (1) 
certificate per megawatt hour (MWh) produced. These certificates are then sold on a separate 
open supply-and-demand market to the electricity users and providers that are obliged to 
purchase a set annual quota of Electricity Certificates (ECs). Thus, the ECs provide an extra 
incentive and income to producers of RES-E. The fact that there is an annual quota 
encourages investment and causes long-term security of supply.  
   This will, in fact, “reduce [a country’s] fossil fuel dependency and mitigate the risks related 
to the security of energy supply” (del Río, 2006, p. 1364). Accordingly, the supporting 
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documents of the ECS state that the system is “intended to help Sweden achieve a more 
ecologically sustainable energy system” (Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, p. 7). Despite these 
potential positive impacts, a pre-study of the ECS acknowledges the fact that an increased 
production of RES-E does not necessarily lead to decreased emissions of carbon dioxide 
unless the total electricity usage diminishes or remains constant. At the same time however, 
simulations on the adoption of the ECS have shown that it will in fact diminish the total 
carbon dioxide emissions in Sweden, and extendedly in the Nordic countries (Swedish 
Government Offices, 2001a, p. 31). 
   As the ECS is a policy instrument employed by the Swedish government to attain a certain 
goal, it is vital to analyze its effectiveness. Importantly, the interaction of the ECS with 
another policy instrument on the same market might cause concern for unintentional 
interaction effects. This was in one way highlighted in a coproduced report by the Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency and the Swedish Energy Agency (2007) that reviewed 
economic environmental instruments, and especially market-based systems such as ECS and 
the EU ETS and their possible conjunction with other instruments. However, the two 
instruments themselves were not compared in detail of the extent of their potential interaction 
effect due to their conjoining objectives. As highlighted by Runar Brännlund
3
 (2011), in the 
case of the ECS, its co-existence with the European Union Trading Scheme (EU ETS) could 
pose a potential empirical problem. This conflict could mean that the ECS does not diminish 
the overall EU carbon dioxide emissions. This can happen because under the EU ETS a cap 
on the total emissions allowed is set on each individual Member State, which can then, in 
order to spur on competitiveness and cost-effectiveness, trade their allowances. If Swedish 
energy consumers and suppliers are forced under the ECS to purchase a certain amount of 
energy from RES-E, and if this amount increases the share of RES-E so much that Sweden 
need fewer emission allowances than it receives under the EU ETS, Sweden can then trade – 
sell – the remaining emission allowances from a Swedish entity to another entity within the 
EU. Thus, the actual carbon dioxide emission is just moved away from Sweden and emitted 
somewhere else within the EU (Vredin, Brännlund, Ljungqvist, Strömberg & Wallgren, 2011, 
p. 198), leading to an offset of the proposed environmental benefits of the ECS.  “The actual 
climate effect of the change [to renewable energy] in […] energy consumption is thus zero; it 
will only cause a redistribution of the carbon dioxide emissions between different emitting 
                                                          
3
 Professor at Umeå School of Business and Economics, who has voiced concerns regarding the interaction in 
several articles and papers (e.g., Broberg & Brännlund, 2010; Brännlund, 2011; Vredin, Brännlund, Ljungqvist, 
Strömberg & Wallgren, 2011). 
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sources within the emissions trading system” (Broberg & Brännlund, 2010, para. 6). 
Brännlund further contests the environmental benefits of the ECS’s interaction with the EU 
ETS by saying that the “Electricity Certificates do not lead to decreased emissions, that is a 
misconception” (Brännlund, 2011, para. 5). His research therefore highlights that there might 
be a specific problem with interactions between national and supranational level policies. In 
this case, it has been noted that the EU ETS at a supranational level may cause conflicts with 
national level policies and offset the environmental benefits that the ECS may induce.  
   Böhringer and Rosendahl are touching on the same problem with their economic analysis of 
the interaction of TGCs and a cap-and-trade system, where they state that the certificates will 
in fact serve the dirtiest electricity producers and only increase the price of reaching emission 
reductions targets (Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2009). Since there is a cap on total emissions set 
by the cap-and-trade system, the TGC system will lower the price of emission allowances 
within the cap due to increased production of non-carbon emitting electricity, and the most 
carbon-emitting electricity producers will increase their production in order to keep the 
emissions cap constant (Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2009, p. 7). Philibert (2011), on the other 
hand, gives other insights on the interaction’s effects and acknowledges that there is an 
interaction but states that the technological advances of the two connected policies on the 
renewable electricity production sector are well worth a possible price increase of reaching 
the short term emission goals (Philibert, 2011, p. 20).  
   Ultimately, as put forward by del Río (2006, p. 1388) this problem concludes in its lack of 
research, both theoretically and empirically. There is some research conducted on the 
implications of both the EU ETS and different national energy policy systems – notably for 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands – before the adoption of the EU ETS, but there is a 
strong absence of any kind of consequence analysis after the emissions trading system has 
been adopted (e.g., Sorrell, 2003b; Meyer, 2003; Sijm & van Dril, 2003; del Río 2006; 
Oikonomou & Jepma, 2008; Kautto et al., 2012). There seems to be a knowledge gap of the 
existence and the implications of an interaction between the ECS and EU ETS from a 
Swedish perspective. Therefore it is of great interest to try to bridge that knowledge gap. 
From a political scientist’s perspective, empirical research on how the interaction is perceived 
and why it is understood differently is the focal point of this thesis where there seems to be a 
disharmony between the ECS and the EU ETS policies. 
 
 
FILIP EHRLE ELVELING, 2012 
8 
 
II.I–Previous research 
Individual research on the ECS and the EU ETS has been conducted and assessed in 
numerous studies, books and articles. The literature on TGCs in general is well-developed and 
has been around for some time. In addition, the particular Swedish ECS policy instrument has 
been assessed for almost a decade and reworked and revised in order to obtain the best 
possible national effects. The EU ETS however has not been in place for that long a time, and 
is, as mentioned earlier, the only example of a supranational emissions trading system. 
Despite this, the core principle of emissions trading and a cap-and-trade system have 
nonetheless been subject to intense scrutiny and evolvement, and the 1970s and 1980s Acid 
Rain Program in the U.S. is the best viable example of experiences gained through a cap-and-
trade system. As of relevance to this study, the individual performances of the two policy 
instruments are of some value, and the TGC literature in general can be seen through works 
from Haas (2001), Fristrup (2003), Lemming (2003), Meyer (2003), Agnolucci (2007) as well 
as Amundsen and Nese (2009). More specific studies of the Swedish system and the 
experiences gained from the period of 2003–2008 are outlined in the study of Bergek and 
Jacobsson (2010), as well as the most recent updates on the ECS from the Swedish Energy 
Agency (2011a) with statistics, projections and assessments. Numerous other articles, studies 
and reports have been written on the subject, but the ones chosen above are the most relevant 
to this study. However, two early studies on a harmonized TGC market in the EU funded by 
the European Commission under the 5
th
 Framework Programme are of note, namely 
INTRACERT (The Role of an Integrated Tradable Green Certificate System in a Liberalising 
Market, 2000) and RECERT (European Renewable Electricity Certificate Trading project, 
2001) that mention procedural terms of harmonizing the internal TGC energy markets. 
   The EU ETS, as with literature on TGC, has been assessed by numerous scholars and 
organizations. Works on the scheme largely focuses on the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
supranational instrument, and can be seen in works by Brännlund et al. (1998), Klepper and 
Peterson (2004), Åhman and Holmgren (2005) as well as Ellerman and Joskow (2008). The 
efforts are mainly focused around the implications of the scheme in general or for a specific 
area – such as Åhman and Holmgren (2006), who assess the entrance obstacles in the Nordic 
energy sector due to the EU ETS – which can provide an overview of the scheme. The most 
relevant data of the scheme and the core functions can be found at the European 
Commission’s Climate Action homepage (European Commission, 2010). 
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   The real valuable studies for this thesis are the assessments of the interaction of the two 
named policy instruments, and here the literature is not as encompassing and numerous as 
with the actual individual assessments and studies of the two. Although there are aplenty of 
papers throughout the past decade that cover the potential for an interaction effect, the real 
consequence analysis studies are strikingly absent. Two main works on the interactions are 
the somewhat opposing papers of Böhringer & Rosendahl (2009) and Philibert (2011). The 
latter is mainly a response paper to the former, and discusses the issues brought up by 
Böhringer and Rosendahl: namely that the interaction of TGC and EU ETS serves the dirtiest. 
Their economic analysis is based on the effect of the carbon price when coupled with the two 
differentiated policy instruments. Their main conclusion states that due to the three-fold 
interaction steps in the medium to long term: the TGCs will decrease the output of carbon-
intensive electricity, which will in turn lower the price for carbon emissions that will, 
consequently, because of the total emissions cap, benefit the most carbon-intensive electricity 
producers since economic market-forces predict that they will increase their output to keep 
total emissions constant. The first short-term effect affects all carbon electricity producers 
symmetrically – and negatively – whereas the second, medium to long term, effect is 
asymmetrical, since the least-emissions intensive electricity producers will decrease their 
production the most (Böhringer & Rosendahl, 2009, p. 7). This statement goes well in hand 
with the problem that Vredin et al. (2011) and Brännlund (2011) acknowledges, which makes 
strong claims that the environmental benefit may well be offset by the two interacting 
policies. Nonetheless, Philibert, (2011) responds to the issues brought up by Böhringer and 
Rosendahl where he assesses the more long-term effects of the technological advantages the 
two policies will bring for the future transition to a renewables based energy society. 
Although he somewhat agrees with the interaction effects of Böhringer and Rosendahl and 
states that the overall costs of achieving the carbon dioxide emission reductions tied to the EU 
ETS may be increased due to the interaction, the technological advances of the renewable 
energy sector are important enough in a long-term perspective to justify the effect. Seeing into 
the future, he argues that renewable energy production will play an even more prominent role 
to mitigate climate change, and that the cost-effectiveness of the technologies must be in place 
to facilitate that transition. Lastly, he argues that a “possible policy recommendation would be 
to take better account of the interactions among policy instruments” (Philibert, 2011, p. 20). 
   Another relevant study for the purpose of this thesis is the literature review of the 
interaction between emissions trading and renewable support schemes, where del Río (2006) 
assesses the literature on the issue and makes general theoretical conclusions based upon his 
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review. An interesting point of his is that the coexistence of the two instruments can be 
justified due to their overlapping policy goals, i.e. reducing carbon dioxide emissions (del 
Río, 2006, p. 1378). He also acknowledges the fact that the more mechanisms, sectors and 
geographical areas the policies cover, the more complex it will be to regulate the synergies 
and interactions. A common regulation market would thus be desirable but such a notion may 
clash with national interests (del Río, 2006, p. 1388). The European Commission had plans 
for harmonization of the renewable electricity support schemes – in particular an EU-wide 
TGC scheme in the late 1990s (del Río, 2006, p. 1366) – but postponed the plans in order to 
gain more practical experiences from different measures (Meyer, 2003, p. 666). Moreover, del 
Río states that the current situation is characterized by “different instruments and targets in 
different countries” (del Río, 2006, p. 1388). One study of implications due to the interaction 
was set specifically in the Netherlands, where the conclusion denotes that the two theoretical 
policy instruments’ coexistence “will have a significant impact on the performance of both the 
EU ETS and the selected instruments in the Netherlands” (Sijm & van Dril, 2003, p. 2). 
However, the study was made before the actual adoption of the EU ETS and was only based 
on theoretical assumptions and historical data.  
   Another study conducted before the EU ETS adoption states that “a combination of an 
international tradable permits market and a green certificate market is seen to be efficient in 
contributing in achieving the national CO2-reduction targets if a close co-ordination of the two 
instruments is undertaken at least at the national level” (Morthorst, 2003, p. 73), a view that 
somewhat differs from the later assessments by Böhring and Rosendahl. Additional readings 
for research on the subject of dispersive nature, method and results are works by Morthorst 
(2001), Bonneville and Riahle (2005), Rathmann (2007), Abrell and Weigt (2008), Brick and 
Visser (2009), and Will (2010). One of the newer studies conducted by the OECD epitomizes 
the discourse by stating that “policy makers in countries with a ‘cap-and-trade’ system in 
place should consider carefully the actual contributions of any other policy instrument(s) they 
apply to address emissions from sources already covered by a binding ‘cap’. There is a danger 
that some of the instruments will increase the total cost of reaching a given (environmental) 
outcome without making future reductions in the ‘cap’ more likely” (OECD, 2011, p. 12).  
   What has become clear and evident is that there are some missing pieces within the research 
conducted on the possible interaction of a TGC scheme and an ETS. Firstly, consequence 
analysis of the interaction is limited to economical predictions of price changes of carbon 
dioxide emissions and cost-effectiveness of achieving the emission goals based on historical 
data with largely differing results, whilst the theoretical research mainly was done before the 
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adoption of the EU ETS. It has been stressed that more research is needed, and based on the 
above mentioned previous research the perspective of how the interaction is perceived by 
policymakers is clearly missing. Secondly, the research has mainly been made on a general 
TGC and ETS market based on theoretical assumptions of the interaction of the two policy 
instruments. There is an apparent knowledge gap of a country specific context in this matter, 
and the Swedish example is no exception. The empirical research from one specific context 
set into the theoretical light of the policy instruments design is scarce, and is of the outmost 
importance in order to make advised and well-conceived policy design choices. Thirdly, and 
lastly, when adding on the perspective of the two-level framework – where a state’s authority 
over the policies formulated on the supranational level is limited – coordination and 
harmonization issues arise on the agenda (e.g., Sijm & van Dril, 2003; del Río, 2006; Will, 
2010; Brick & Visser, 2009). In order to solve a potential negative interaction effect the 
coordination between the national and supranational level may have to improve significantly, 
and there might be a need for harmonizing policy instruments for renewable electricity 
production on the supranational level. 
 
 
II.II–Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the interaction between the Swedish Electricity 
Certificate System and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme seen from a Swedish 
perspective. Research shows that different scholars understand the interaction effects 
differently and the actual empirical findings on whether the interaction is a problem or not are 
unclear. Due to the scarcity of available empirical research and relevant theoretical 
frameworks on the issue, an inductive approach is chosen for this study. By looking at the 
specific example of the interaction between the Swedish Electricity Certificate System and the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, the thesis is set out to try to generate theoretical 
considerations that can explain the interaction in general terms which might enhance policy 
interplay understanding. This can in one way be described as moving from the specific to the 
general. The primary mode of analysis will be the development of four central concepts
4
 
where connections and contradictions of the empirical findings are generated into a theoretical 
framework that captures the key components of the interaction.  
                                                          
4
 These concepts will be presented more extensively in the chapter II.VI–Central concepts, page 20. 
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Figure 1. Interaction between the Swedish Electricity Certificate System (ECS) 
                    and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.III–Research questions 
The thesis centers around two research questions. The first one is of a more descriptive nature, 
which will help map out and create a picture of the connections and contradictions of different 
perceptions of the interaction. The second question has more explanatory character, by 
clarifying and illuminating the understanding of the first question. By answering the two 
questions, explanations and reasons for various viewpoints on the interaction effect are 
elucidated which will enable the development of a conceptualized theoretical framework.  
 
♦ How is the interaction between the Swedish Electricity Certificate System and the European 
Union Emissions Trading Scheme perceived in Sweden?  
 
♦ Why is the interaction problem understood so differently? 
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II.IV–Electricity Certificate Act 
The Electricity Certificate System (ECS) is a form of a Tradable Green Certificate (TGC) 
system that, by entitling renewable electricity producers with a certificate for a certain amount 
of electricity produced, creates extra revenue to be obtained through the additional sale of the 
certificate aside from the normal sale of electricity. The demand of the certificates generally 
originates from a quota obligation (del Río, 2006, p. 1366). Some of the first countries to 
adopt a scheme in different forms for increased production of renewable electricity through 
TGCs were the United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, the Netherlands and the state of Texas in 
the U.S. (Swedish Government Offices, 2001b, pp. 47–57). 
   The first initiative to establish the Electricity Certificate Act (ECA) was taken in a 
committee’s terms of reference from the Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and 
Communications (2000) which commissioned a Swedish Government Official Report (SOU) 
on the matter, led by director Nils Andersson. Indications in the committee’s terms of 
reference of how the electricity certificate system could be designed were drawn from the 
Swedish Government’s guidelines set out in an earlier government bill (Swedish Government, 
2000). The 2001 SOU report suggested a system based on the guidelines of a market-based 
quota-system and proposed the ECS to commence in accordance with the committee’s terms 
of reference on January 1
st
 2003. The ECA was promulgated through adoption in the Swedish 
Riskdag, adopted in the Swedish Code of Statutes (SFS) and came into force on the 1
st
 of May 
2003 (Swedish Code of Statutes, 2003).  
   Since the first enactment there have been several evaluations, proposals and reports on the 
system that extended the law on certain technical notes. The Swedish Government 
commissioned the Swedish Energy Agency in 2003 to conduct a first overhaul of the ECS that 
led to two reports, which eventually were concluded in the Ministry Publications Series report 
The Electricity Certificate System’s Development5 (Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and 
Communications, 2005). The newest law that came into force on the 1
st
 of January 2012 
(Swedish Code of Statute, 2011) also includes greater leeway for a common ECS market with 
other countries, and there is currently an agreement with Norway for such a common market.    
 
                                                          
5
 Translation from Swedish: Elcertifikatsystemets utveckling. 
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II.IV.I–Electricity Certificate System 
The ECS obliges a certain annual quota of RES-E to be purchased formally by the end-user, 
although the electricity provider is obliged to adhere to the quota of the delivered electricity if 
the end-user does not actively seek to fulfill his or her own quota. The ECS is a market-based 
policy instrument that, through the obligation of quota-fulfillment, provides an extra revenue 
income for producers of RES-E where one electricity certificate (EC) is awarded for each 
megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity produced (Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, pp. 7–8). The 
ECs and electricity are sold unbundled, which means that the ECs are sold on a separate, 
open, demand-and-supply market, which, consequently, provides income to the producer from 
both the sold electricity and certificates (Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, p. 7). In this way is 
security of supply upheld and the additional revenue for the entitled electricity producers is 
supposed to spur on additional production, capacity enhancing measures and long-term 
investments so that the market may mature and create technologies for electricity production 
that in the future can be commercially viable (Swedish Government Offices, 2001b, p. 41).  
   The overarching goal of the ECS is to promote the production of RES-E (Swedish Code of 
Statutes, 2011, para. 1). The goal is a result of the overall shift from traditional fossil-based 
fuels to a society based on renewable energy sources happening throughout Sweden, the 
European Union and other industrialized countries (Böhring & Rosendahl, 2009, p. 3). This 
act is often referred to as the ‘transition’ of the energy sector and is a step towards mitigating 
carbon dioxide emissions, as well as improving energy security, building locally decentralized 
energy systems and fostering sustainable development in order to prevent global warming and 
climate change (European Union, 2001; Philibert, 2011, p. 9). In accordance with the climate 
goals, the increased production of RES-E is thought to create a more ecologically sustainable 
energy system (Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, p. 7). The transition to include more non-
carbon dioxide emitting electricity in the energy mix could decrease the carbon dioxide 
emissions and thus decrease the environmental impacts of electricity production and usage. 
   The more specific goals for the increased production of renewable energy was set first in the 
2001 initial SOU report, proposing to increase  RES-E by 10 terawatt hours (TWh) between 
2003 and 2010 (Swedish Government Offices, 2001b, p. 37). This goal was seen as ambitious 
compared to the small increase of 1.5 TWh in the earlier period from 1997–2002 (Swedish 
Government, 2006, p. 26). The goal has since increased significantly, and is of now set to 25 
additional TWh by 2020 – an increase of 13.2 TWh from 2012 to 20206. The latest adoption 
                                                          
6
 See Table 9 in Appendix C for a breakdown of the quotas and forecasted production increase. 
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has been reached in common with Norway to produce the accumulated target of 26.4 TWh 
from 2012 to 2020 (Östberg, 2011, p. 3). The joint market is supposed to create a larger 
market with a greater number of both quota obliged parties as well as renewable electricity 
producers. This is thought to improve the overall competition of the market and increase 
liquidity and create more stable prices (Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, p. 8). 
   Entitled sources of renewable energy for the production of renewable electricity approved 
for obtaining electricity certificates under the ECS are; wind power, solar energy, wave 
energy, geothermal energy, biofuels, peat – when burnt in Combined heat and power (CHP) 
plants – and hydro power – if the producing entity either; at the end of April 2003 had a 
maximum installed capacity of 1500 kW per production unit; is a new plant; has resumed 
operation from being closed due to rebuilding or other investments so that the plan can be 
regarded as new; increased production capacity from existing plants, or; can no longer operate 
in an economically viable manner do to decisions by the authority or to extensive rebuilding. 
All new entitled plants commissioned after the enactment of the ECA are entitled to 
certificates in the ECS for 15 years, or to the end of 2035 (Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, p. 
7). The two governing authorities covering the ECS are the Swedish Energy Agency and 
Svenska Kraftnät (Swedish National Grid), both state-owned public utility companies 
(Swedish Energy Agency, 2011, p. 8).   
   As a summary of the ECS, the logic model underneath in Table 1 pictures the parts and 
processes if the instrument and its intentions.  
 
 
Table 1. Logic model of the Swedish Electricity Certificate System 
 
Input Activities Output Outcome 
Financial means 
Renewable electricity 
certificate obligation 
Compliance with quota 
obligation for RES-E 
production 
Increased 
production of RES-E 
Personnel 
RES-E production 
certificate issuing 
Increased revenue for RES-E 
producers 
Increased 
investments in RES-
E production 
 
Tradable certificate 
system 
Diversified electricity 
production 
Increased 
competitiveness for 
RES-E producers 
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II.V–European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a form of market-based cap-
and-trade instrument that ultimately puts a ceiling on allowed emissions of carbon dioxide 
within one or several sectors. If the allowed emissions are not used, they can be traded to 
another entity. Built upon the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
as well as the Joint Implementation (JI) flexible mechanisms, the scheme creates a price on 
carbon dioxide that is thought to be the most cost-effective way of reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions within the European Union (European Commission, 2008a, pp. 5–7; Jordan et al., 
2010, p. 125). 
   The first notion of a tradable permit was mentioned by Ronald Coase in 1960 on dilemmas 
of collective action and property rights (Coase, 1960) and has since been developed further 
into means of a policy instrument, especially within the environmental policy field through 
Dales (1968) and Montgomery (1972). Emission trading is in theory thought to possess a 
number of advantages over regulatory policy instruments, such as the mentioned greater cost-
effectiveness, along with its spur of technological innovation and flexibility in emissions 
reduction, as well as its relatively simple policy design that creates a greater democratic 
legitimacy (Jordan et al., 2010, p. 126). The cap-and-trade program has been compared to 
taxation where it is denoted that the greater predictability of achieving the carbon dioxide 
reduction objective gives it an important advantage, and that taxation does in fact force 
polluters to adjust their emission level to where the marginal costs of abatement are equal to 
the taxation rate. However, emission trading caps the total amount of emissions, and thus the 
price adjusts accordingly (Ekins & Barker, 2001; Jordan et al., 2010, p. 126).  
   The first cap-and-trade program was the Acid Rain Program in the 1970s and 1980s in the 
U.S. (Ellerman et al., 2000), where a group of market-based-favoring policy-makers 
generated political support for its adoption (Voß, 2007, p. 335). The program was given praise 
for its success in achieving reduced emissions with saved costs and technology innovation 
(see Ellerman et al., 2003). Thus originally imported from the U.S., the European 
Commission advocated for the establishment of an EU-wide emissions trading system in a 
1998 Communication (European Commission, 1998) instead of an EU-wide carbon-and-
energy tax that had been put down earlier in 1991–92 (Jordan et al., 2010, p. 69, 131). The 
reason for the adoption of an emissions trading system instead of taxation can be derived from 
the fact that tax regulations requires unanimity within the European Council, a reason to why 
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the carbon-and-energy tax proposal collapsed, whereas the emissions trading system could be 
adopted by a qualified majority vote (Jordan et al., 2010, p. 69). 
   The adoption of the Directive was made in 2003 (European Union, 2003) and the scheme 
formally commenced on the 1
st
 of January 2005. The EU ETS is the first supranational 
emission trading system for carbon dioxide ever adopted (European Commission, 2010, para. 
1), and is ideally set out to provide incentive and lessons for a possible global emissions 
trading scheme (Delbeke, 2006; Jordan et al., 2010, p. 125). The European Commission 
released a proposal of a revised Directive in a Communication in January 2008 (European 
Commission, 2008a) and formally the Directive was changed in 2009 into the current 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (European Union, 2009b). 
   The EU ETS can be divided into three phases, also called trading periods. Phase I lasted 
from 2005–2007 and was widely seen as a warm-up phase (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008, p. 7) 
and covered roughly 40% of EU carbon dioxide emissions (British Broadcasting Corporation, 
2006, para. 5). It was labeled a “learn by doing” pilot phase before the crucial Phase II 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 8). As noted by the European Commission, the first 
period’s environmental benefits may have been limited due to excessive allocation of 
allowances in some Member States and sectors, mainly due to allowance projections that were 
unreliable (European Commission, 2008c, What are the main lessons learned from experience 
so far, para. 1).  The first phase did, however, put in place the necessary infrastructure and 
opened up a dynamic carbon market for further trading of emission allowances (European 
Commission, 2008c, What are the main lessons learned from experience so far, para. 1). 
Phase II spans years 2007–2012 and the allowance allocations process is revised in order to 
prevent over-allocation. The total amount of allowances compared from 2005 to the Phase II 
period was decreased by 6.5% (European Commission, 2008a, p. 16).   
 
 
II.V.I–Principles and functions  
The cap-and-trade principle of the EU ETS means that there is a total cap, or limit, on the 
amount of emissions of certain greenhouse gases (GHGs) that are allowed to be emitted. The 
companies within the covered sectors receive emission allowances and they must, at the end 
of the year, surrender as many allowances as to cover all of their emissions. One EU 
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Allowance (EUA) is currently measured as one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent
7
. If a 
company cannot surrender enough allowances it has to pay heavy fines and surrender as many 
allowances as emitted beyond its allowance share the following year. Allowances that are not 
needed can be traded to other companies that might be short of allowances, which ensures that 
the emissions are cut where the cost-effectiveness is at its highest. At the moment the EU ETS 
operates in 30 countries (EU27
8
 and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and covers carbon 
dioxide emissions from sectors such as power stations, combustion plants, oil refineries, iron 
and steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper 
and board. Since January 2012 the airline sector is also covered by the EU ETS (European 
Commission, 2010, Growing bigger and stronger, para. 3). 
   Companies can also choose to invest in emission reduction technologies for their operations 
or use less carbon-intensive energy in order to decrease their emissions, where they 
consequently could sell their allowances or even bank them for next year (European 
Commission, 2010, How does emissions trading work, para. 2). The EU ETS covers some 
11,000 installations within its 30 countries, and amounts for almost half of the carbon dioxide 
emissions within the EU and over 40% of total GHG emissions (European Commission, 
2010, Growing bigger and stronger, para. 2). According to the European Commission, the EU 
ETS “should allow the European Union to achieve its emission reduction target under the 
Kyoto Protocol at a cost of below 0.1% of GDP, significantly less than would otherwise be 
the case [if the Member States would individually seek measures for emission reductions]” 
(European Commission, 2008a, p. 5). According to official statistics, the GHG emissions 
from “[…] big emitters covered by the EU’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS) have fallen 
by an average of more than 8% since the start of the system in 2005” (European Commission, 
n.d., para. 1).  
   In practice, during its current Phase II, the EU ETS is designed so that every Member State 
will choose how to allocate the emission allowances for its covered sectors and companies, 
and is required to set up a National Allocation Plan (NAP). The European Commission must 
however scrutinize the NAPs in order to ensure compatibility with the overall cap for the EU 
                                                          
7
 Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): “A metric measure used to compare the emissions from various 
greenhouse gases based upon their global warming potential (GWP). Carbon dioxide equivalents are commonly 
expressed as ‘million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (MMTCO2eq).’ The carbon dioxide equivalent 
for a gas is derived by multiplying the tons of the gas by the associated GWP” (U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, 2011, C, para. 5). 
8
 The European Union’s 27 Member States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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as well as each country’s Kyoto Protocol targets (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009a, para. 1). In 
Sweden, the Swedish Energy Agency is responsible for the operation management of the 
Swedish registry system for the scheme, the Swedish Emissions Trading Registry (SUS) 
(Swedish Energy Agency, 2012). The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency deals with 
and makes decisions of the allocated emission allowances in the Swedish NAP to concerned 
companies. The agency is also responsible as a supervision body that controls the companies’ 
actual annual emissions, and drafts national legislation regarding the allocation process, 
monitoring, reporting and verifying processes. The Ministry of the Environment is in turn 
responsible for EU and national negotiations regarding the EU ETS and the compliance of 
national legislation on the matter (Swedish Energy Agency, 2009b).  
   Since the adoption in 2005, the EU ETS has only covered emissions of carbon dioxide. 
However, with the new revised EU ETS Directive (European Union, 2009b) commencing in 
Phase III of the new trading period (2013–2020), nitrous oxide will be included from 
production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production, and perflourocarbons from the 
aluminum sector. Carbon dioxide emissions from additional sectors such as petrochemicals, 
ammonia, and aluminum will also be included. The new revised EU ETS is thought to create 
a more efficient, harmonized and fairer system (European Commission, 2008c, What are the 
main changes to the EU ETS and as of when will they apply, para. 2).  
   The main difference of the third trading period is the longer duration, eight years instead of 
Phase II’s five, a more robust emissions cap reduction – 21% cap reduction in 2020 as 
compared to 2005 – and the substantial change from free allowance allocations through 
grandfathering – allocations based on historical emissions – to instead auctioning them to the 
relevant companies and sectors – from less than 4% in Phase II to more than 50% in Phase III. 
The auctioning process will however be phased in and will not cover all sectors immediately. 
The NAPs will thus be abolished since the single EU-wide cap will provide the regulations 
regarding allowances auctioned and allocated based on harmonized rules (European 
Commission, 2008c, Will there still be national allocation plans (NAPs), para. 1, 2). The EU-
wide cap on emission allowances will follow a linear factor of 1.74% decrease and the cap for 
2013 has been determined to 2,039,152,882 allowances (European Commission, 2011b, Cap 
for 2013 determined at 2,04 billion allowances, para. 1, 2). 
   As a summary, the logic model underneath in Table 2 depicts the components and processes 
if the EU ETS policy instrument and its intentions.   
 
  
FILIP EHRLE ELVELING, 2012 
20 
 
Table 2. Logic model of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
Input Activities Output Outcome 
Financial means 
Carbon dioxide 
emissions cap 
Cap of carbon dioxide 
emission allowances 
Decrease of carbon 
dioxide emissions 
Personnel 
Decrease of carbon 
dioxide cap over time  
Carbon dioxide emissions 
are priced 
 
Allowance trading 
mechanisms 
 Climate change mitigation 
   
Increased investments in 
carbon-neutral 
technologies 
 
 
II.VI–Central concepts 
The central concepts of this thesis will permeate the structure of the data collection, empirical 
findings, analysis and conclusion. They form the basis of the scope of the study and thus 
effectively delimitates unwanted variables and notions that may be raised when using an 
inductive approach of empirical studying since there is no demarcating theoretical framework 
to maintain within. This is needed in order to establish a mode of analysis when studying the 
perception of the interaction. The four central concept categories are created based on the 
problem framing and previous research on the matter as well as on the detailed descriptions of 
the ECS and EU ETS. The derivation of the categories are as follows; first the perception of 
the problem is to be investigated and the studied actors give their perspective on the 
interaction and problem framing; secondly, the effectiveness of the two instruments is 
assessed individually in order to establish their purposes and a source of goal output 
effectiveness for the instruments and the interaction; thirdly, the different autonomous polity 
levels where the policy instruments reside is examined through national sovereignty over 
policy formulation and implementation, and fourthly; the need for harmonization and 
coordination is assessed as potential remedies of the interaction effect and its associated 
synergies. The individual analytical characteristics are discussed more in-depth below. A 
frame outline table for the descriptive evidence that will summarize the collected data is also 
shown further down. 
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Table 3.  Central concepts 
 
Perception of 
problem 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National sovereignty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Harmonization & 
coordination 
 
The perception of the problem is derived from the problem framing 
which states that there is a case of an interaction between the two 
instruments. However, research has shown that different scholars and 
studies understand the effects differently. The empirical evidences are 
scarce of what the interaction might actually cause. The interaction is 
not intrinsically regarded as negative, it might also be positive and 
provide wanted, although unintended, synergies. This category 
addresses how the interaction is perceived from the Swedish 
perspective and its possible effects. 
 
The effectiveness category examines the actual goal output and the 
purposes of the two instruments. Effectiveness here means doing the 
right thing, and shall not be confused with efficiency which means 
doing the thing right. The effectiveness of the two instruments of 
fulfilling their goals and that translation to the interaction will be 
analyzed from the Swedish perspective.  
 
The national sovereignty category assesses the potential cause of the 
interaction since the interacting policy instruments reside at two 
different autonomous – national and supranational – levels. This fact 
proposes underlying concerns that there might be a decrease of 
national sovereignty in policy formulation and implementation on the 
national level since the supranational level has authority on certain 
areas which will create a threat against the national sovereignty and 
obstruct possible correction attempts.  
 
Possible remedies for the interaction can be of varied characteristics, 
but especially harmonization and coordination are mentioned 
throughout the previous research on this subject. Thus, the 
harmonization and coordination category is derived from previous 
research that show signs of a much needed coordination of 
supranational and national level policies, as well as harmonization of 
policies on supranational level in order to create an integrated single 
energy market within the EU.  
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   The descriptive evidence found within the empirical findings from the qualitative interviews 
will be inserted in the table below (Table 4) in order to assess the different viewpoints and 
perceptions of the interaction. To obtain the connections and contradictions of the data, the 
table will create an overview that is easily manageable yet comprehensive of the key findings’ 
components. The analysis part of the thesis will be guided by the central concepts and the 
findings are presented within their respective category. The analysis will assess the findings 
both under their respective category and in combination. The descriptive evidence table will 
enhance the overview of the empirical findings and lastly the analyzed data will form the 
basis for answering the research questions. 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive evidence frame 
 
Source Interaction 
Theoretical 
problem 
Empirical 
problem Impact 
Respondent 1 Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No/Maybe Description 
Respondent 2… Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No/Maybe Description 
Respondent N Yes/No Yes/No Yes/No/Maybe Description 
Note: The respondents’ viewpoints are based on the evidence from the empirical findings and not of any direct 
quotes.  
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III–Design and methodology 
In order to answer the research questions of this thesis the design choices and methodological 
considerations were established before the data collection began. The framing of the design 
and methodology thus investigated how involved actors in the relevant field perceive the 
problem from a Swedish perspective and tries to explain the underlying structures of the 
experiences and processes of the empirical findings in order to develop an increased 
understanding of the interaction and its variability. The inductive approach of generating 
theory tries to capture the key themes of the previously established central concepts and the 
connections and contradictions of the processes judged to be important for the generalizable 
conceptualizing theoretical framework 
 
 
III.I–Design 
The unit of analysis in the study is the interaction between the two policy instruments 
Electricity Certificate System (ECS) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS). The study employs a qualitative study of the Swedish perspective of the interaction. 
Consequently, the study inherits some elements of a cross-sectional and a comparative study. 
This is due to the single time and place of data collection where similarities to cross-sectional 
quantitative analysis can be seen where the qualitative research looks for a connotation of 
causality (Bryman, 2008, pp. 44, 49). In this thesis, the causality derives from the interaction 
of the two policies and what effects that causes and how those effects are understood. The 
level of analysis is the Swedish perspective of the interaction, and thus the analytical part is 
twofold. The design therefore features an ideographic approach where the unique elements 
and characteristics of the Swedish perspective are elucidated of the level of analysis, whereas 
a nomothetic approach is put upon the generality of the unit of analysis, namely the 
interaction effect per se. The nomothetic approach makes the analysis applicable to different 
periods of time and place based upon the unique features of the other context – the level of 
analysis. This sort of study creates a deepened understanding of an already existing problem 
where research has shown signs of knowledge gaps and empirical deficits (Bryman, 2008, pp. 
54–55). Moreover, in terms of what sort of study, it was conducted as an exemplifying study 
since the level of analysis does not contain any extreme features of specific sorts (Bryman, 
2008, pp. 55–56).  
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III.II–Selection and delimitations 
The selection of potential level of analysis actors to study can be summarized into three major 
considerations since the complexity of the problem framing and the different policy 
instruments vastly diminished the actors even considered for the study. Firstly, although the 
perspective is set out from Sweden, knowledge of both the national and supranational 
interaction is required where both technical expertise and overarching policy framing 
considerations are necessary in order to cogently answer the interview questions. Secondly, 
the actors must be able to acknowledge any potential interaction of the two policies as well as 
their individual effectiveness, which are mainly based in different professional fields, namely 
climate change mitigation and renewable energy promotion. Thirdly, and most importantly, 
the research questions pose strong ties to political considerations and attitudes on both 
national and supranational level. It is of vital importance that the actors reveal their perception 
of the problem based on their empirical expertise of the interaction rather than on their 
political support or leverage. The political dimension can of course never be neglected 
entirely, but it is not a prominent factor of investigation of this study. The selection was made 
using a strategic approach which means that the selection was deliberately made out of the 
defined criteria and made so to cover several aspects of the studied case (Torell & Svensson, 
2007, pp. 83–84). The selected actors all adhere to the previously mentioned criteria of 
supranational and national interaction associability; expertise and knowledge of either one or 
both of the two policies; and no obvious political affiliation that may affect the answers. 
Consequently, the actors researched are civil servants and scholars involved in the 
construction, analysis, implementation and management of the ECS and the EU ETS. The 
actors are presented below with a brief description of their main involvement within the 
problem framing.  
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Table 5. Strategically selected actors 
Swedish Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications – Energy Division 
          Responsible for providing expertise on the ECS. 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency – Policy Instruments for Climate and Air Department 
          Responsible for analyzing consequences of the EU ETS. 
Swedish Ministry of Environment – Division for Climate Change Policy 
         Responsible for national targets and expertise on the EU ETS. 
Swedish Energy Agency – Policy Analysis Unit; Electricity Certificates Unit 
         Responsible for analyzing and maintaining the ECS and operating the EU ETS registry. 
The Swedish Permanent Representation to the European Union – Energy Counselor  
         Provides a link between the European Union and Sweden regarding energy issues. 
University of Gothenburg – Environmental Economics Unit 
        Conducts research on climate and energy. 
Governing transitions towards Low-Carbon Energy and Transport Systems for 2050 (LETS2050) 
         Conducts interdisciplinary research on climate and energy issues. 
 
 
   Other viable actors that could be of possible considerations are interest groups, the 
European Union, and organizations and actors affected by the two policy instruments – such 
as renewable electricity producers and companies covered by the EU ETS. However, when 
looking at the three selection criteria the interest groups do not qualify for the study due to 
their apparent inherent interests mainly derived from their political affiliation. Neither were 
there any interest groups to be found that had deep knowledge of the supranational and 
national perspective of the two interacting policies. The European Union falls out of the 
selection due to the apparent supranational perspective. Whilst interesting to incorporate, the 
study was made from a Swedish perspective and does not cover supranational intentions or 
reasoning. Additionally, the European Union has limited knowledge of the specific conditions 
of the Swedish ECS and can thus not be strategically selected.  Lastly, the affected actors are 
in a role of inherent inimical affiliation since their motifs may be biased towards their 
function in either or both of the two instruments.  
   Out of the strategically selected actors, a total of nine respondents were chosen to be 
interviewed. The selection of respondents was made by contacting the selected actors and 
finding the most relevant persons. The contact was made through phone calls and electronic 
mail after initial research on the actors and their staff. Persons with internal knowledge of the 
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institutions helped identify the most relevant persons in a form of snowball sampling where 
the initial contact person’s knowledge and network was used to identify the best suitable 
person choice (Bryman, 2008, p. 184). In one case three persons were selected from one actor 
in order to tap the full expertise of the concerned institution. The caveat of selecting only one 
or few persons from a whole organization might induce that the views expressed are not 
necessarily of the organization as a whole, but of that particular individual respondent. 
However, since the limited number of people viable for selection and an even lesser number 
of matching actors and persons of interest based upon the criteria of selection, no other choice 
was appropriately or even applicable for this study. The persons do however influence the 
work of their respective institution and can thus be regarded as the actual expertise on the 
problem framing of the study. Thus the respondents are not relative to a population but can 
instead be classified as experts within their fields and of this thesis’s problem framing. The 
selected persons were: 
 
Table 6. Chosen respondents from the selected actors 
Truls Borgström – Deputy Director 
          Energy Division, Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications 
Eva Jernbäcker – Senior Advisor 
          Policy Instruments for Climate and Air Department, Swedish Environmental Protection Agency 
Olle Björk – Deputy Director 
         Division for Climate Change Policy, Swedish Ministry of Environment 
Gustav Ebenå – Head of Unit 
         Electricity Certificates Unit, Swedish Energy Agency 
Johan Karlsson – Program Manager 
         Electricity Certificates Unit, Swedish Energy Agency 
Klaus Hammes – Head of Unit 
        Policy Analysis Unit, Swedish Energy Agency 
Martina Högberg – Energy Counselor  
         The Swedish Permanent Representation to the European Union  
Jessica Coria – Research Fellow 
        Environmental Economics Unit, University of Gothenburg 
Fredrik NG Andersson – Ph.D. Economics 
         Department of Economics, Lund University, LETS2050 
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III.III–Data collection 
The data collection was made using qualitative interviews with the selected persons in order 
to obtain the respondents’ perspective and to single out what the interviewees see as important 
and relevant (Bryman, 2008, p. 437). The interviews were all based on a predetermined set of 
questions
9
 based on the earlier presented central concepts
10
. However, the exact phrasings of 
the questions varied and were tailored for each respondent depending on the background and 
context of the respondent. As often seen in qualitative interviewing techniques, follow-up 
questions were asked (Bryman, 2008, p. 437) and the sequence of the questions asked varied 
due to differing answers. The goal was to obtain rich, detailed answers of the respondents in 
order to obtain the most relevant knowledge. The interviews were treated as informant 
interviews, where the respondents act as information sources of a phenomena or occurrence 
which is suitable for an inductive study design (Esaiasson, Gilljam, Oscarsson & Wängnerud, 
2007, pp. 257–258, 285–287). Chosen parts of the data collected were transcribed to facilitate 
the process of sorting out the relevant data to be presented within the empirical findings.  
   If categorized, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured manner since the 
questions were based on an interview guide but with significant leeway for departing from it 
in different directions (Bryman, 2008, pp. 437–438). Although the questions in the interview 
guide may not have been phrased, framed or asked in the same way, all questions were asked 
at some point and the interviews were conducted in a manner as similar as possible (Bryman, 
2008, p. 438). The main reasoning behind the choice of semi-structured interviews is that it 
allows for flexibility. This is particularly relevant in cases where answers may not be worded 
in terms of yes and no due to the complexity of the problem framing and the divergent 
expertise of the respondents. The respondents’ understanding of the problem is central where 
the explaining of each interviewee’s patterns in the overall context is of importance (Bryman, 
2008, p. 438). Since the study has a clear and explicit focus, the semi-structured interview 
technique is preferred over more unstructured ones in order to obtain answers to the research 
questions. In contrast, a structured interviewing was not applicable, as the issue of the 
interaction is too complex for any quantifiable or coded answers (Bryman, 2008, pp. 437–
439). Due to the relatively small number of possible relevant respondents, the semi-structured 
interview is to be preferred since it combines the rich, detailed answers of an unchartered 
problem framing with a valid ability of obtaining the answers needed for the study’s focus.  
                                                          
9
 See Appendix A for the complete interview guide. 
10
 Perception of problem; effectiveness; national sovereignty, and; harmonization & coordination. See page 20.  
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III.IV–Interpreting the results 
Certain considerations are worth mentioning when designing and conducting a study and 
consequently interpreting the results. In the social research design discourse no notions are more 
prominent than those of validity and reliability. The notions are mainly derived from quantitative 
research designs, but are valid to be discussed from a qualitative perspective as well. In its purest 
essence, the discussion centers around the fact that a successful study design needs to adhere to 
certain standards in order to be regarded as credible (Bryman, 2008, pp. 376–378). 
   Internal validity sets the tone in regards to how good the match is between the researchers’ 
observations and the theoretical ideas that are developed. A high level of congruence between 
concepts and observations is needed to fulfill internal validity. As for this thesis, the connection of 
empirical findings and the developed framework is inherently intertwined and builds upon the 
former, which creates high internal validity. Although the theoretical framework is not established 
beforehand, the interconnection between the perception of the interacting policy instruments and 
the afterwards generated framework establishes a clear link between the observations and the 
theoretical ideas. 
   External validity is assessed as to the degree of how the findings can be generalized across 
social settings and different contexts. Qualitative research tends to be conducted through various 
case studies with small samples, which in turn will create a problem for generalization of the 
results (Bryman, 2008, pp. 376–377). This factor can be regarded as being either high and low, 
depending on the viewpoint. On the one hand, the theoretical developments are constructed in 
such a way that they are generalizable across other contexts, thus having high external validity. 
However, the specific case of Sweden might not be generalizable across other contexts and social 
settings. The specific components of the Swedish case may be unique in such a way that other 
contexts might not have any use of the research. This, however, seems intuitively unlikely as there 
ought to be common components over different contexts which will increase the generalizability 
and make the research worth considering for other contexts. Additionally, it has been argued that 
qualitative research findings are meant to generalize to theory rather than to populations which is 
the case in this study due to the inductive approach. The people interviewed are not meant to be 
representative for a population, but are instead selected due to their specific knowledge and 
expertise (Bryman, 2008, pp. 391–392). 
   External reliability on the other hand, is regarded as the degree to which a study can be 
replicated. This however is a difficult criterion in qualitative research since the ability to freeze 
social settings and contextual circumstances could be regarded as impossible (Bryman, 2008, p. 
376). The initial study can hardly be replicable identically if the circumstances are not the same in 
later studies, which denotes the degree of external reliability as fairly low for this study. However, 
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since the methodological and design considerations are clearly stated, the reproducibility of the 
study’s ditto can be regarded as good, whereas the external reliability of the empirical findings is 
low since the results may differ due to the change in social and contextual settings.  
   Summarily, the above assessed considerations of the criterions of validity and reliability 
might determine the quality of the research conducted. Although the picture it paints might 
not be a universal truth, the indication does at least provide valuable considerations to keep in 
mind when interpreting the results, analysis, conclusion and subsequent theoretical 
developments. An important acknowledgement here is the notion of Guba and Lincoln who 
states that the validity and reliability criterions presuppose that a “single absolute account of 
social reality is feasible” (cited in Bryman, 2008, p. 377). They argue that the simplistic view 
of one absolute truth about the social world that is the job of social scientists to reveal is 
invalid and that there can actually be more and possible several other accounts (Bryman, 
2008, p. 377).  
   Finally, considerations worth mentioning regarding the implications with the qualitative 
research method through interviewing should be mentioned. To begin with, awareness of 
factual errors and misunderstandings that could occur during the interview, be they deliberate 
or involuntary, is crucial. Even experts can make mistakes, and the issue might be complex 
enough that the answers might be falsified. Misunderstandings can happen from both parts, 
where the respondent can misinterpret the questions or the interviewer can misinterpret the 
answers. The interviewer does also have an effect on the shape of the interview, and the 
personality and the phrasing of the questions can affect the respondent’s answers and the way 
the answers are given (Halvorsen, 1992, p. 89). The interview is shaped by the participating 
persons (Jacobsen, 2002, p. 270) and the respondents could get bored or afraid of showing a 
lack of knowledge regarding a certain question, which could lead to made-up answers in order 
to make the interviewer satisfied (Jacobsen, 2002, p. 162). In addition, there is a possibility of 
self-interests from the respondent’s side, where certain information could be withheld or 
exaggerated in order to obtain specific interests of the respondent. An understanding of the 
respondent’s self-interests and his or her organization’s interests are therefore of great 
importance (Esaiasson et al., 2007, pp. 327–329). The questions the respondents were asked 
may seem benign, but neglecting the omnipresent possibility of human error would be overly 
Panglossian and could prove cataclysmal once conclusions are drawn. In all, this means that 
the analysis and the conclusions of this thesis were conducted with regards to the above 
mentioned considerations and with as an objective a mind as possible.  
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IV–Empirical findings 
The data obtained from the respondents of this study are presented below. The empirical 
findings relevant to the study are depicted under their respective central concepts category in 
order to create a comprehensive and structured understanding. The findings are presented in a 
neutral manner, thus leaving room for the reader to make his or her own unbiased scrutiny of 
the data. Thus, this chapter leaves the analytical and interpretative part to the ensuing 
Analysis chapter. The interviews yielded a great many differing opinions on the interaction, 
and diverse tendencies, factions, interpretations and presumptions can be seen. The findings 
are therefore very divergent at times but despite this there are noteworthy connections and 
contradictions on certain aspects of how the interaction is perceived.  
 
 
IV.I–Perception of problem 
In regard to whether there is an interaction between the Swedish Electricity Certificate System 
(ECS) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) or not the findings are 
relatively unanimous. No respondent denied that the two instruments are overlapping each 
other, affecting each other and thus interacting dependent on the design of the policies. Since 
the EU ETS covers electricity production facilities, there is an apparent interaction of the two 
instruments (Respondent 2, personal communication, 2012) in one way or the other 
(Respondent 7, personal communication, 2012). Due to this, there is some sort of correlation 
between the prices that might cause different consequences (Respondent 9, personal 
communication, 2012), which in turn can neutralize or counteract the two different policy 
goals (Respondent 8, personal communication, 2012). However, respondents were more 
diverse in their answers about to which degree the interaction causes any apparent effects.  
Some respondents proposed more research on the subject to determine the magnitude 
(Respondent 9; Respondent 3, personal communication, 2012). There were even more diverse 
answers on whether the interaction was perceived as a problem or not. Some regarded the 
issue as problematic, more costly and with unnecessary double-regulations, while others did 
not perceive it as a problem due to the non-conflicting goals of the two instruments, the 
current cap space available under the EU ETS, the insignificant impact of the Swedish market 
on the whole of EU, as well as the fact that the Swedish electricity production is practically 
carbon-neutral to begin with (Respondent 9).  
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   More detailed was the perception of whether the interaction causes a problem or not 
depicted as two different problems; one theoretical and the other empirical. As mentioned 
before, everyone acknowledged the fact that there is an interaction of the two instruments, 
where each affects the other. All respondents were adamant that this was a theoretical 
problem, but were split on the question whether it was an empirical problem. In particular, the 
instruments were for example regarded as not being in conflict with each other, especially 
now as of 2012 where many EU ETS allowances are not in use (Respondent 7; Respondent 1, 
personal communication, 2012). If it would be a “battle on the knife’s edge for every EU ETS 
allowance” however, the scenario might be different (Respondent 1). There is no demand to 
perceive the interaction as a problem due to the political and democratic support of the ECS in 
Sweden (Respondent 4, personal communication, 2012). Also, the effects of the interaction 
have not been clearly distinguished and therefore cannot be perceived as a problem, nor are 
there any signs that the effect would be severe enough to alter any price levels or create any 
goal orientation conflict (Respondent 4; Respondent 6, personal communication, 2012). 
   The most stressed reason for the interaction to not be perceived as a problem was the notion 
that the ECS should not be regarded as a climate policy instrument. The ECS was never meant 
to be a climate instrument, and the reason for adopting the ECS was instead to create a ‘third 
leg’ of electricity production independent from nuclear and hydro power in order to create a 
larger diversity of supply and strengthen the energy security (Respondent 9; Respondent 7; 
Respondent 4; Respondent 1; Respondent 6). The climate effect of the ECS was also 
mentioned to be non-existent since almost all of Sweden’s electricity production already is 
carbon-neutral. If new electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E) from the ECS 
would push aside old electricity from non-carbon emitting sources, the climate effect would 
still be the same (Respondent 9). 
 
“The Electricity Certificate System promotes new RES-E production that could push 
aside some power production within the EU ETS, and thus will the emissions move 
within the system. That is however not a problem if the goal of the ECS not is to 
diminish any climate effects. I can understand the viewpoint of that it might get more 
expensive, but since that [reducing climate effects] has never been the purpose [with 
the ECS] it [the interaction] will not cause any problem.” – Respondent 9 
 
However, the viewpoints part on whether the ECS is actually a climate policy instrument or 
not, where some state that it actually is since the reason for switching to renewable electricity 
production is inherently climate positive (Respondent 5, personal communication, 2012; 
Respondent 8). Several respondents argue that the ECS also stems from trying to fulfill the 
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targets for Sweden in the EU’s Energy 2020 strategy and Renewables Directive (Respondent 
2; Respondent 6; Respondent 9). It was also noted that there might be a climate effect of the 
ECS, but it is not the sole purpose of the policy. Reasons for adopting the ECS were not 
reasons for climate effects, but the availability of forests, land areas and a long windy 
coastline instead of the use of other carbon dioxide emitting energy sources (Respondent 1).  
 
“The most important reason is that these are types of energy that are readily 
available in Sweden. We do not have that much coal, we have some uranium but we 
are not allowed to mine it, also there is no natural gas in Sweden. I think that it 
[renewables] were closest at hand. We have to use what we have.” – Respondent 1 
 
   In terms of describing the consequences of the interaction the respondents were yet again 
divided into the two factions of a theoretical and an empirical problem. Everyone agreed that -
– due to the design of the EU ETS of confining the concerned sectors within a cap – there is a 
chance for excess emission allowances caused by more non-carbon-emitting electricity 
production and usage in Sweden which could be sold and transferred to other countries within 
the EU, thus offsetting the environmental benefit of the ECS. This interaction problem is 
however the case for all energy-support policies inside the cap of the EU ETS. The actual 
effects of this and their magnitude are very unclear. Some appreciate the effects and think of it 
as a problem, although some agree that the effect is there, but the impact is negligible. Due to 
the large cap space within the EU ETS, the effect is diminished since the limitations to 
production are not the EU ETS allowances since the price is so low and other factors are more 
important for production (Respondent 7; Respondent 1). In case the EU ETS cap would be 
tighter, the magnitude of the interaction effect might be more severe and noteworthy. 
However, the interaction is thought to be self-regulating because if the EU ETS allowance 
price would be higher due to the lowered cap and thus increase the price for electricity, it 
would in turn increase the revenue for the electricity producers which would increase RES-E 
producers’ profitability, thus lowering the price for the electricity certificates due to a higher 
abundance of RES-E at the market since more are willing to invest due to the higher 
profitability. This would cause the ECS to play a smaller role since the high EU ETS 
allowance prices would stimulate the market in the right way (Respondent 7; Respondent 1).  
   Others, as stated before, perceive the offset of the environmental benefit as a problem since 
it causes goal conflicts. The interaction problem was discussed almost a decade ago in the 
wake of the ECS adoption and the emergence of the EU ETS, and of its potential interaction 
effects (Respondent 5; Respondent 2). The main argument for the interaction to be a problem 
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is the increased price burden put upon the consumers that will have to pay more money for no 
apparent reason (Respondent 5; Respondent 2; Respondent 8; Respondent 3). “It is too costly 
for the environmental effects it causes” (Respondent 3) and simulations have been made that 
show signs that forcing certain measures – as the ECS induces – will in fact increase the price 
for climate policies (Respondent 5; Respondent 2). The interaction specifies where the 
measures are to be taken, which adds unnecessary conditions counteracting the argument of 
the EU ETS where measures are taken when the cost-effectiveness is highest (Respondent 5). 
Other respondents acknowledged this fact in one way or the other, but were adamant that that 
is not a problem since the increased cost-burden for consumers, whilst not gaining any climate 
effect due to the transfer of the allowance to other countries, is not thought to create 
environmental benefits but instead to fulfill the Swedish national EU renewable energy targets 
as well as to create a more diverse security of supply. 
   The answers again go wide apart on whether the interaction serves the most carbon-emitting 
technologies. This concern originates in the fact that the most carbon-intensive companies 
will be able to purchase more allowances from other firms since the ECS lowers the demand 
for allowances and thus decreases the price. It is stated to be true by most respondents, but the 
appreciation of whether that is a problematic issue or not is more opaque. While some argue 
that it definitely is the case and that it causes some kind of a subsidy to fossil-intensive 
industries (Respondent 5; Respondent 4) the notion of the technological incentives for firms 
to invest in carbon-neutral technologies could be discouraged by the lowered price for the EU 
ETS allowances (Respondent 3). In the short run, one respondent appreciated this problem, 
but stated also that it does not have any meaningful effect in the long run since the cap of the 
EU ETS will diminish over time, and that the sole determinant is the actual cap (Respondent 
8). Some perceived it as a non-problem and raised awareness of that although it might not 
create specific incentives for new technologies, all support-systems for increased renewable 
energy production are affected by that interaction problem regardless of the actual magnitude 
(Respondent 6). 
  
“I have spent a considerable amount of time to convince politicians that this is the 
case [that the interaction effect is a problem] […].” – Respondent 5 
 
It was also brought up that if the limiting factor of production are the actual allowances, the 
interaction might cause concern for the ‘serves-the-dirties’ effect, but since other facts might 
be more important, such as coal price, the interaction effect is mainly theoretical whilst not 
happening in reality (Respondent 1; Respondent 7). Another important aspect of the 
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interaction was mentioned that although this might be true, there is a form of double-steering 
that decreases the price for the allowances and increases the cost-burden for consumers. If the 
EU ETS had acted on itself and the prices had been considerably higher, it is not very likely 
that the prices had been kept that high in order to protect the industries, and thus other 
measures would have been taken in order to decrease the EU ETS allowance prices anyway 
(Respondent 2). It was stressed that it is also good to make certain investments at the right 
time, and although it might not be rational with conflicting interactions, it is also rational to 
move away from fossil electricity production towards renewable electricity production. This 
might enable Sweden to export carbon-neutral electricity which in turn might decrease the 
carbon dioxide emissions in other countries, despite the initial higher cost-burden 
(Respondent 2). Investments in new technology is important to move further ahead on climate 
and energy matters (Respondent 8; Respondent 5) and in order to do that, there is a need for 
“[…] a mixture of policies for energy and climate. It is all connected.” (Respondent 2).  
  Another factor that was brought up was the constraint on the interaction caused by the EU 
ETS, since the amount of allowances under the cap is the main determining factor of whether 
the effect is problematic or negligible (Respondent 8; Respondent 2). The cap in itself is a 
powerful measure that can spur on technological advances without any other policies 
interfering (Respondent 8; Respondent 5) but depends mostly on the size of the cap 
(Respondent 8). Other instruments are necessary in order to create the clusters of 
technological development needed to reach climate goals and national renewable energy 
targets which could poise Sweden to become a leading actor in export of both technology and 
carbon-neutral electricity (Respondent 8; Respondent 6).  
 
 
IV.II–Effectiveness 
In order to understand the interaction, the individual effectiveness of the policy instrument’s 
purposes must also be assessed. Herein does the goal output orientation lie which could 
potentially explain the interaction or its proposed effects. The ECS is generally thought of as 
being a good instrument when it comes to fulfilling its goals; which is to increase the 
production of new renewable electricity at a price as low as possible.   
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“I think it is a pretty good system, partly because it is long term, and partly because 
it encourages the most cost-effective technologies, is market-based and technology-
neutral and does not affect the state budget. Experiences from countries that use 
feed-in systems show that there is a risk of overcompensation, higher costs for 
supporting renewable energy and a lack of predictability in the support levels, 
therefore the Electricity Certificate System looks like a pretty good solution.”            
– Respondent 6 
 
Moreover, the political support for the system is high since it has survived a government 
coalition shift and is still very cost-effective (Respondent 9). It definitely fulfills its targets 
(Respondent 2), and is very good at promoting cheap renewable electricity (Respondent 1). It 
also creates a base load of clean, carbon-neutral electricity which can help stifle price peaks in 
winter when electricity demand is higher (Respondent 7). It was yet again stressed by many to 
not constitute a climate policy instrument (Respondent 7; Respondent 1; Respondent 9; 
Respondent 4; Respondent 6; Respondent 2), while others did perceive it to be related to 
climate with one – amongst other – main purpose to reduce the carbon dioxide emissions of 
Swedish electricity production (Respondent 5; Respondent 8; Respondent 3). It was described 
that the system worked as designed although the volatility of the certificates’ prices could be a 
potential problem, but since the companies are used to act on a free market they were used to 
handle price fluctuations (Respondent 4). However, the long term perspective was argued to 
be of some concern since the concerned companies invest with horizons of up to 60 years, 
which could be a problem for technological development since the ECS only runs until 2035 
(Respondent 8). The system also mostly encourages the almost-market-ready technologies 
and will not spur on the least-developed ones (Respondent 2). Despite this, the technologies 
that are not fully competitive on a free market will benefit greatly to be able to stand on their 
own in the future (Respondent 3). Thus, the ECS promotes the ‘easiest’ technologies first 
(Respondent 8). Increasing technological development is difficult to attain, and several 
externalities are associated with the ECS, in part due to the interaction effect with the EU ETS 
(Respondent 3). 
   Most respondents believed that the system will stay in place for its allotted time frame, but 
after that it mostly depends on any new legislation from the European Union. In case new 
targets will be set by the EU for new RES-E production, a prolongation of the system is 
possible, but decisions will not be taken before 2020 (Respondent 9; Respondent 6). 
However, one respondent pointed out that the current analysis showed that the system might 
not be needed after its expiration date since the technologies by then will most likely be 
mature enough to compete on the open market, and also that the EU ETS allowance price will 
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be higher and thus create more incentives for carbon-neutral electricity production 
(Respondent 4). Other policy instruments, such as feed-in tariffs and feed-in premiums used 
in other EU countries were not thought to be any better per se, but instead had higher costs for 
the amount of RES-E produced (Respondent 7; Respondent 1; Respondent 4). 
   Assessing the EU ETS, the respondents were overwhelmingly in accord that technically the 
system is good, but the political side of it is lacking since the targets are set too low. The 
system itself works as it was designed to work, and it creates a price on carbon dioxide 
emissions (Respondent 8). The price volatility however could be problematic and the issue of 
over-allocating allowances in order to create acceptance for the instrument has created very 
low allowance prices which causes the system to not work as intended (Respondent 8). The 
cap is thought to be too generous, but several respondents argue that the system is better than 
nothing, where for example an EU-wide carbon tax is not politically feasible and thus the EU 
ETS is described as a second best (Respondent 9; Respondent 7). Independent on the price of 
the allowances, the system creates a cap which in itself is good since the emissions cannot 
exceed the cap (Respondent 4). However, there are details in the system that are not working 
as thought (Respondent 4) and it is more of a political issue to correct the system to 
appropriate levels but not of the actual design of the policy (Respondent 5; Respondent 2; 
Respondent 6). In theoretical terms it is a very powerful policy, but too many phases with 
loopholes and different opt-out clauses prevent the system from working as it is intended to 
(Respondent 2).   
 
“It’s a text-book solution. You can complain against a policy but then you need to 
think about the alternatives, and then you need to see the alternative implemented 
and then you can start looking at the failures that are going to be relevant to that 
policy. I don’t think it’s a system that will have no problems since the EU is very 
diverse.” – Respondent 3  
 
   In reality, it is hard to implement the perfect cap-and-trade system and the situation right 
now was thought to be very worrisome (Respondent 2). Initiatives have been taken to 
decrease the cap or to withhold or remove allowances from the system, but several Member 
States have strenuously opposed such measures, partly because they feel their industries’ 
competitiveness would suffer and because their economic situation is fragile as it is already 
(Respondent 5). However, as noted by several respondents, the quest for the perfect policy 
instrument must not lead to doing nothing (Respondent 7). In this way, the EU ETS can, by 
minor tunings, be a very powerful policy instrument (Respondent 2; Respondent 5; 
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Respondent 4). It was also noted that since the prices are so low, it might not actually be that 
expensive to take the required measures to keep the emissions under the total cap. Although 
the price level might not currently encourage long term investments in carbon-neutral 
technologies and electricity, it might also be a result of the EU being able to take actions that 
are very cheap in order for the price to drop so low (Respondent 6). Although this points to 
that there are no apparent problems with the low allowance prices if the cap is set correctly, 
the projected carbon emission reductions of the EU ETS are roughly 70% for 2050 which 
needs to be considerably higher if global climate goals are to be reached, thus rendering the 
low carbon prices as a failure of the cap (Respondent 5; Respondent 2).  
   All respondents agreed on that the EU ETS is here to stay, in one form or the other. Despite 
the flaws in the system, the necessary commitment it took to implement it, and for the 
stability of the concerned sectors, there is no apparent reason why the system would be 
abolished. Further developments are dependent on international climate negotiations 
(Respondent 3) where similar cap-and-trade systems are to be implemented in Australia, New 
Zealand and California. These are systems that could be merged and harmonized with, thus 
creating greater political stability (Respondent 5). Complementary policies might be 
necessary however – such as policies that promote research and innovation (Respondent 2) – 
in order to spur on technological advances (Respondent 8). This is in spite of the fact that the 
system most likely will be in place for a long foreseeable future, even though some Member 
States want to abolish it (Respondent 5). An additional potential sector to be included is for 
example the maritime shipping industry (Respondent 5; Respondent 6). 
 
 
IV.III–National sovereignty 
Most respondents agreed that the national level, and consequently Sweden’s authority, is 
threatened by the supranational level of the European Union. The extent and consequences of 
this fact are however less clear. There are examples of EU legislation that can threaten the 
Swedish policy formulation and implementation, but usually the overall targets are set at the 
EU level whilst the Member States have some leeway of how to manage and reach the targets 
(Respondent 9). It was believed to be a problem by some, especially if other countries can 
block certain Swedish initiatives in the EU (Respondent 2). Although the threat might be 
there, some argue that it should not be seen as a problematic issue all the time, but rather only 
in some cases and for some Member States (Respondent 5).  
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“If you have a mechanism on the EU level and Sweden cannot find support from 
other countries for its opinion, then of course Sweden has lost its autonomy. That is 
somewhat the point of the EU. But if Sweden would not have been a member of the 
EU we would not have had any real autonomy either since we live in a globalized 
world […].” – Respondent 8 
 
The issue was described as affecting the national sovereignty, since some issues are 
conducted at the EU level where Sweden cannot do exactly how it pleases all the time 
(Respondent 6). The scope lies not solely within Sweden, but also within the EU. The system 
is still democratic; regardless if it is within Sweden or the European Union, the democratic 
rules are still the same (Respondent 8). The process to integrate with the EU was deliberate, 
and some competences where handed over to the supranational level, especially after the 
ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (Respondent 4). Thus, it can be described as a threat since 
some competences reside at the supranational level, but it is also a democratic decision and a 
circumstance due to Sweden’s EU membership (Respondent 4). 
   In terms of correcting any potential negative interaction effects, the decrease of national 
sovereignty could definitely be a factor and a problem, especially if Sweden has to change the 
ways of subsidizing renewable electricity production (Respondent 6). For example can the 
European Commission exert autonomy over energy policies when claiming internal market 
reasons (Respondent 6). By formulating the policies to deal with the Single European market, 
with regard to unjust competitiveness between different Member States, the EU can obtain 
autonomy over the Member States, and in particular over this interacting issue regarding the 
ECS and the EU ETS (Respondent 6). Also there are reasons to believe that the European 
Commission is trying to obtain autonomy over such issues that are of relevance to the union 
and the internal market (Respondent 6). Due to the many different levels of government and 
governance, there are reasons to believe that it should be a problem since it is not only 
national and international, but also municipalities and regions that want to take actions even 
though the externalities are always transferable (Respondent 3). Admittedly, there are 
interactions between different polity levels, but there are also interactions on the same level. 
For example there are several EU directives that might be at odds with each other. There are 
also policies within the Swedish level that do not connect very well, simply because reality is 
not as easy as theoretical models (Respondent 7). There are interactions both between and 
within different levels, but as long as Sweden has some control over one part of the 
interaction, can it be influenced and consequently corrected (Respondent 7).  
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IV.IV–Harmonization & coordination 
The issue of whether an EU-wide ECS would be desirable for Sweden comprised of two main 
arguments. Firstly, the general notion was that Sweden would benefit from such a system and 
would proceed with processes to open up the ECS’s market for other countries. It is stated in 
the government legislation surrounding the ECS that Sweden would be open to expand the 
system to other countries, as has recently happened with Norway for example (Respondent 9). 
Theoretically, it would be advantageous for Sweden since a lot of wind power, for example, 
could be built in Sweden, thus increasing Sweden’s security of supply, local development, 
foreign investments and potential sales of renewable electricity to other countries (Respondent 
9; Respondent 8). Secondly, the other side would be more problematic, where questions 
regarding on how the EU-wide system would be designed, and who would decide what in 
terms of sales and building permits, arise (Respondent 6). It was also revealed that the 
renewable energy potential in Sweden could be fully tapped which could backlash and 
eventually increase the costs for Swedish renewable electricity production in the future 
(Respondent 7; Respondent 6). However, this scenario is not very likely in reality 
(Respondent 8).  
   When it comes to a need for harmonization at the EU level on policies surrounding 
renewable electricity production and especially the ECS, the responses were largely the same. 
It would not be bad for Sweden if other countries would adopt the same system, and thus 
leave the Swedish system as it is, but if harmonization were to be conducted, Sweden might 
have to adapt to another system which, from the Swedish perspective, might not work as 
efficiently and effectively (Respondent 9; Respondent 6). An argument for an EU-wide 
certificate system would be the cost-effectiveness of it, because the investments are made 
where costs are the lowest. However, this would also mean that the electricity is produced in 
certain cost-effective areas, which could decrease the energy security, diversity of supply and 
local and green development, which several countries would oppose and therefore such a 
scenario is not very likely to happen (Respondent 9). Despite this, other reasons for 
harmonizing the systems would be the increased homogeneity for companies operating in 
several countries within the EU (Respondent 9; Respondent 6) and the fulfillment of the 
renewable targets within Sweden which would benefit the EU (Respondent 7). Since 
harmonization could be described as something between what currently is (Respondent 3), 
this type of streamlining of the policies on the supranational level might increase the chances 
to produce larger quantities of renewable electricity, but might also have legitimacy and 
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accountability issues when the authority is moved so far away from the individual 
(Respondent 8).  
 
“The electricity prices in each country are different, so even if you harmonize the 
systems you would still have differences in terms of the relative magnitude of the 
impact of different countries.” – Respondent 3 
 
Questions arose of how the system would be designed, and whether there would be separate 
targets for each Member State, or a common target for the whole of the EU (Respondent 6).  
   On the issue of coordination, the respondents gave a wide variety of answers on whether 
there was a need for increased coordination or not. To a large extent, most respondents were 
very positive to more and better coordination between different polity levels and within them. 
Especially when interlinked with global climate issues, an arena where the EU has taken the 
driver’s seat in many international climate negotiations, coordination is needed to stave off 
potential interaction effects and environmental offsets (Respondent 2; Respondent 5). 
Moreover, more and better coordination is needed regarding a wide range of policy 
instruments within the field that could create technological developments, and there is a need 
for a complete vision that can be communicated throughout the different levels of governance 
and policies (Respondent 8). Coordination should be the basis of EU legislation, where more 
direct policy instruments could reside at the national levels (Respondent 8). However, it is 
easy to say that more coordination is needed but not as easy to implement due to the myriad 
of different policies and polity levels (Respondent 3). Integrated policy coordination is very 
complex, and many policymakers have their own hobby-horses which could be hard to 
overcome and give up (Respondent 5; Respondent 3).  
 
“At the end of the day there are so many interactions everywhere. If you are going to 
have so many different levels, you need to have good collaboration and coordination 
to stave off these kinds of interaction effects between different policy instruments.”   
– Respondent 3 
 
   Ultimately, there cannot be perfect coordination, but one can always try to improve it 
(Respondent 3), or at least express a desire to improve it (Respondent 5). There is an 
interaction effect – although the impact is uncertain – and it is known of, and should thus be 
coordinated accordingly to diminish any possible negative effects (Respondent 5; Respondent 
3). The political side can neither be forgotten, where policymakers might not always respond 
to technical criteria since other factors might be more important (Respondent 3). The 
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preferences of different instruments, strategies and assessments from various Member States 
are aspects that are difficult to coordinate (Respondent 3).  
   On the other side, other respondents downplayed the potential of more coordination. In 
some cases there might be advantages of formulating policies individually since, when other 
instruments are factored in, it otherwise might get very complex and chances are that one 
misses the target of the policy (Respondent 1). Since there are so many other policies in other 
countries, the care and consideration for them might just overshadow what was thought to be 
created in the first place (Respondent 1; Respondent 4). 
 
“More on the philosophical side will the quest for the perfect policy instrument only 
lead to paralysis. It is somewhat given in the current situation that there are risks 
associated with finite resources, climate change and other environmental issues. 
Despite these risks, it is still better to do something with decent efficiency than to sit 
and draft a design of an instrument until you find the [perfect] solution. Because you 
can be certain that the reality will change and cause problems in the future anyway.” 
– Respondent 7 
 
The perfect policy instrument does not always reveal itself from coordination with other 
policies, and questions arise when other policies are altered which might start a chain reaction 
of effects since the other policies where based on the first one (Respondent 7; Respondent 1). 
Additionally, the coordination is still thought to be good and analysis-information is delivered 
to relevant actors within Sweden and the EU (Respondent 4).  
 
“We take every opportunity offered to voice our opinions to ensure that policy 
instruments are not undermined or that interaction effects are noticed, so the ones 
we have, we use. So there is no space to do more right now. If they [the EU] would 
signal that they were receptive to more information would we also provide more.”       
– Respondent 4 
 
The opinions already expressed found the basis on where coordination can be achieved and 
more of that would not necessarily lead to any change for the better (Respondent 4). It was 
also expressed that there seems to be an unwillingness to listen to individual Member States 
opinions’ from the EU side. Were that to change, the coordination process would still be very 
complex and iterative to take advantage of (Respondent 4).  
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V–Analysis 
To ease up the structuring of the analysis, this chapter is divided into three major parts. 
Firstly, the descriptive evidence table (Table 7, as previously outlined in Chapter II.VI–
Central concepts) is assessed to make an overall judgment of the respondents and their 
opinions. Secondly, the empirical findings are analyzed in more detail under their respective 
central concepts category to withhold the structuring of the previous chapter. Thirdly, and 
lastly, the research questions of this thesis are answered on the basis of the aforementioned 
other two parts of this chapter.    
 
 
V.I–Overall assessment of the findings 
The findings that were made in the empirical findings of the data collection are very diverse 
and have several elements of underlying factors that can explain the variances. The table 
below gives an overview of the opinions expressed. 
 
Table 7. Descriptive evidence 
 
Source Interaction 
Theoretical 
problem 
Empirical 
problem Impact 
Respondent 1 Yes Yes No 
No instrument conflict, ECS is not a 
climate instrument 
Respondent 2 Yes Yes Yes 
Problematic, but might be needed 
to spur on technological advances 
Respondent 3 Yes Yes Yes 
No real impact, but problematic 
with external effects 
Respondent 4 Yes Yes No 
No real impact, ECS is not a climate 
instrument, might increase EU ETS 
allowance price volatility 
Respondent 5 Yes Yes Yes 
Climate measures become more 
expensive unnecessarily  
Respondent 6 Yes Yes No 
No real impact, ECS is not a climate 
instrument 
Respondent 7 Yes Yes No 
No instrument conflict, ECS is not a 
climate instrument 
Respondent 8 Yes Yes Yes 
Problematic, too high EU ETS cap is 
the problem  
Respondent 9 Yes Yes No 
ECS is not a climate instrument, 
unclear impact 
Note: The respondents’ viewpoints are based on the evidence from the empirical findings and not of any direct 
quotes. 
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What is noteworthy in the above table is the unanimity of the perception of that there is an 
interaction between the Swedish Electricity Certificate System (ECS) and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). All respondents agreed on that there is an interaction, 
and all respondents also believed it to be a theoretical problem. Cause for concern about the 
theoretical effects of the interaction was voiced, and no respondent believed that there can be 
no negative effects in theory. However, on the fact whether the interaction is an empirical 
problem or not, the results depart from the unity and the naysayers are five against four. This 
raises awareness of the great uncertainty of the interaction as mentioned in the previous 
research on the interaction and is mirrored by the empirical findings of this thesis. Evidently, 
there seem to be no real consensus on the matter. Moving on to the impact assessment, the 
respondents viewpoints of the interaction emerges and specifies the reasons for it to be an 
empirical problem or not. The two factions are confounded in their inherent opinion where the 
naysayers assert that the ECS is not a climate policy instrument, where the other faction does 
not state that opinion. Looking even closer, the naysayers are also persons who are or have 
worked with the ECS directly within the Swedish public administration, whereas none in the 
other faction has. This is a very interesting and unexpected finding which will be further 
developed and elaborated in the second part of the analysis.  
 
 
V.II–Operationalization of the central concepts 
The empirical findings are hereunder analyzed through their respective central concepts 
category to ease the use of the collected data. The operationalization will form the basis of the 
third analysis part where the research questions are answered.  
 
 
V.II.I–Perception of problem 
The viewpoints on whether the interaction is a problem or not go wide apart as previously 
noted. As seen in the Descriptive evidence table (Table 7) all respondents agreed on that there 
is an interaction between the two policy instruments and that the interaction effects could 
theoretically be a problem. However, the empirical problem opinion varied, and the reasons 
for that can be divided into two categories. Firstly, the persons whose opinion is that there is 
no empirical problem with the interaction are all adamant that the ECS is not a climate policy 
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instrument – henceforth called the NCP (No Climate Policy) Faction. Alongside the 
mentioned literature on Tradable Green Certificates (TGCs), which reference to its climate 
impact value, Swedish Government Official Report simulations before the adoption of the 
Electricity Certificate Act (ECA) on its potential for carbon dioxide emission reductions, and 
other hints, suggest the ECS to be an energy and climate policy. Despite this, the NCP faction 
elevates other reasons for the ECS to exist. Diversity of supply is cited as the most prominent 
one which increases new base load renewable electricity in the energy system and creates a 
third leg of sorts alongside the two main sources of electricity in Sweden; nuclear and hydro 
power. Another reason mentioned was that renewable energy sources are readily available in 
Sweden, where the long coastline provides fortunate conditions for wind power and large land 
areas for biomass opportunities. Other sources that could also be available to diversify the 
electricity mix and increase the energy security, such as coal and gas, are not abundantly 
available in Sweden and would thus fall off the table. The natural choice then fell upon 
renewable energy sources. Additionally, the new electricity from renewable energy sources 
(RES-E) also helped to fulfill Sweden’s goals of a 49% share of renewable energy in the gross 
final consumption of energy from the European Union’s Renewables Directive (European 
Union, 2009a). Therefore, the ECS was not intended to create any environmental effects and, 
according to the NCP Faction, is therefore not to be regarded as contradictory to the EU ETS. 
This faction only consists of persons working directly or having directly worked with the ECS 
within the Swedish public administration.  
   The other person’s viewpoints – the CP (Climate Policy) Faction – contradicted the former 
by not rejecting the fact that the ECS is in fact a climate policy instrument. Albeit the 
legislators’ intentions, the RES-E is de facto connected to carbon dioxide emission reductions 
and consequently climate policies. The ECS is thus inferring on the climate policy 
instruments domain and the interaction causes unwanted effects. This faction consist of 
persons that are working with either the EU ETS within the Swedish public administration or 
are academic scholars who analyze the policies and their impacts from an outside perspective. 
Although this faction might have an understanding for that the ECS is not solely a climate 
policy, the instruments’ interaction still creates a problem. 
   What the reasons are for the two factions to appreciate the purposes of the instruments 
differently are however hard to isolate. The possible explanation might depict fundamental 
intrinsic beliefs and values of the two factions. Since the NCP Faction solely represents the 
energy side of it, with technical and emotional ties to the ECS instrument, their beliefs might 
be shaped by the organizational translation of the goals. However, the CP Faction is engrained 
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with climate policies such as the EU ETS or other related instruments, and their technical and 
emotional ties to the ECS instrument are shaped as an intruder on the climate policy arena – 
due to its inherent climate component – and is thus regarded as an unnecessary evil. The 
consequences of this are clear to see in the various perceptions of the interaction.  
   That the EU ETS allowances are – as mentioned in the previous research by Brännlund and 
Broberg (2011) –, theoretically freed up because of the increased influx of carbon-neutral 
electricity in the energy mix as a consequence of the ECS, and later on transferred to other EU 
countries so that there is no positive environmental effect of the ECS and the higher price-
burden for the Swedish energy consumers, is uncontested by both factions. However, the NPC 
Faction contests the problem of the environmental offset by stating that the ECS is not a 
climate policy, and thus should not be judged for something it is not supposed to do. Also, the 
high number of EU ETS allowances under the cap diminishes the impact of the interaction 
since the carbon allowances are thought to not be the limiting factor of production. The CP 
Faction however claims this to be problematic since the interaction undermines the EU ETS 
effect. Additionally, the prices of the allowances are lowered since the demand for them is 
decreased because the electricity mix is less carbon-intensive. This causes a contradictory 
effect when the EU ETS allowance price is diminished due to the ECS, and consequently 
reduces the impact of the EU ETS. Also, the CP Faction asserts that this will only lead to 
higher prices for the consumers for no apparent climate effect – as researched by Böhringer 
and Rosendahl (2009). This factor is nevertheless ignored by the NCP Faction since the pure 
size of the Swedish electricity market and the ECS makes the impact on the whole of the EU 
ETS system negligible. Lastly, the investments in new technology might require extra 
incentives which could be generated by the ECS and in the long run cause effects that are 
positive for climate change mitigation – as noted by Philibert (2011). The CP Faction has 
some understanding for this and admits that the higher price might be needed in some cases.  
   What these results ultimately boil down to are two standpoints where one disagrees with the 
other. One the one hand, the interaction is perceived to be a theoretical problem, but not an 
empirical one since the impact is very uncertain and is rendered negligible, along with the fact 
that the ECS is not even supposed to be a climate policy instrument. On the other hand, the 
theoretical problem of the interaction prevails along with the empirical problem that causes 
climate change mitigation policies to be more costly although the impacts for such an 
assessment are uncertain. Thus, the interaction between the ECS and the EU ETS exists, but 
discrepancies arise about its impact and whether it is a problem or not since no comprehensive 
empirical research has been carried out on the magnitudes of the effect.   
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V.II.II–Effectiveness 
The major findings in this category are the different goal outputs of the two policy 
instruments and their contradictory effects due to their purposes. The ECS is thought to be a 
very good instrument for delivering new RES-E production at low costs, and is set to reach 
the targets that have been put upon the system. The EU ETS however is technically working 
well, since the emissions are under a cap, but the overflow of emission allowances is 
decreasing the price for the allowances and is therefore not sending the strong signals needed 
for firms to invest in new and less carbon-intensive technologies. This low EU ETS allowance 
prices does not have to be seen as a failure of the system since the carbon emissions are still 
under the cap, and even well under, which could be a receipt of effective and cheap emission 
cut measures. However, the cap is projected to generate emission reductions by 70% to 2050 
which is far too little to reach the global climate goals, such as the Copenhagen Accord 
(UNFCCC, 2009, p. 5). Therefore, the large number of allowances under the cap is a problem, 
and therein lies the goal conflict. The goal of the ECS is to increase the production of 
renewable electricity which is carbon-neutral, which will then decrease the price for EU ETS 
allowances since the demand for them will decrease with the higher share of non-carbon-
emitting energy usage. By deploying these two instruments simultaneously, the reasons for 
them to exist and their overall goals will contradict each other.   
   On the other side, since the electricity production in Sweden was mentioned to be almost 
carbon-neutral, any new input of RES-E will only push away non-carbon-emitting electricity 
anyway. This would mean that the goal conflict is erased since there is no effect on the carbon 
price allowance market of the EU ETS. This case was however not agreed on by all 
respondents which lead to thoughts about the underlying structures of the policy instruments. 
There seems to be a conflict of the goals and the outputs of the respective instruments, where 
the ECS is thought to have two different goals at the same time, both increasing RES-E 
production and also reducing carbon dioxide emissions. However, the NCP Faction does not 
agree with this, but thinks instead of the ECS as only providing incentives for new RES-E 
production to diversify the electricity production and thence improved energy security. By 
looking at the Logic Models of the two instruments (Table 1 and 2) the conclusion leads to an 
apparent goal conflict where A thinks of B differently than what B thinks of B and vice versa. 
More detailed, the CP Faction thinks differently of the ECS and of what the NPC Faction 
thinks of the ECS, as compared to how the NCP Faction thinks of the ECS and thinks of how 
the CP Faction thinks of the ECS. The goals are thus thought to be overlapping by one faction 
but not by the other. 
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V.II.III–National sovereignty 
What can be drawn from the data on the national sovereignty category is closely tied to the 
interaction itself. As previously stated, the interaction effect is evident, and a proposed reason 
for it to exist is partly due to the two autonomous levels at which the two instruments reside. 
By being a member of the European Union, Sweden has transferred some authority from the 
national level to the supranational level. The EU ETS is regulated from the supranational EU 
level where Sweden has limited authority to control and change it. But, as expressed by one 
respondent, as long as Sweden has authority over one of the interacting policy instruments 
any unwanted effects can be staved off – in this case the ECS. However, as expressed by 
another respondent, if the EU will claim internal market reasons for any changes of or control 
over the ECS, the authority will thus be moved away from the national level up to the 
supranational level, leaving Sweden with no sovereign authority over either of the two 
interacting policies. This would thus be a factor when it comes to correcting instrument(s) for 
any negative and unwanted effects due to a possible interaction. 
   Whereas the multi-level polity system plays a role in the interaction, the decrease of the 
national state sovereignty is not clearly evident to be a cause for the interaction. The 
respondents varied their answers on this point, and gave inconclusive and inconsistent 
remarks on this issue. There might be a threat to the national sovereignty which can increase 
interaction effects, but instruments at the same polity level are known to be interacting as well 
and there are no clear suggestions that this example is unique for supranational and national 
polity level interactions. Interactions are omnipresent in policymaking areas that are 
overlapping in the policy mix. The EU and Sweden will have several interacting policy 
instruments both within each level and also spanning across the two with notions to that 
regional and local levels matter too. This can thus create problematic issues for instruments 
when the governance systems are encompassing several policy areas and polity levels, but are 
not a distinct cause for the interaction between the ECS and the EU ETS. The autonomous 
levels in this case can presumably make the interaction more resilient and harder to correct 
since neither have full authority over both polity levels during normal circumstances. 
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V.II.IV–Harmonization & coordination 
As often proposed by studies on the matter of interacting policies, harmonization and 
coordination are two viable remedies to dampen or completely solve a possible negative 
interaction effect. The respondents gave in essence quite similar answers on the 
harmonization issue which is thought to be beneficial for both the EU and Sweden in terms of 
increasing the new RES-E production in a cost-effective way. Such a harmonization would 
lead to a more level playing field for the companies within the EU since the rules would be 
the same throughout the Member States. Harmonization would also create stronger signals for 
firms throughout the union to invest in new RES-E production. However, the chances that 
such a harmonization would occur are slim, since most of the Member States in the EU have 
different policy instruments for spurring on RES-E production, and the idea of a greater share 
of renewable electricity in the energy mix is not always favorable. Although unlikely, such a 
harmonization would diminish the effect of the transferable emission allowances due to the 
greater share of carbon-neutral energy usage since the whole union would be covered by that 
particular policy. Despite this, such a harmonization would also possibly increase the price 
decrease of the EU ETS allowances further due to the influx of more carbon-neutral 
electricity in the mix, and would thus not solve nor diminish that effect of the interaction. 
   In regards to better coordination between the polity levels, the respondents had more varied 
answers to give. Most thought of it as being a good idea in general, and acknowledged 
especially that it was an area that could always be improved. To coordinate policy issues 
around overall goals and possible unwanted effects on all levels seems to be needed in many 
ways to diminish any contradictory policy effects. However, some respondents were adamant 
that the coordination hardly could be improved, and that designing policy instruments 
independent of other instruments on various polity levels in various Member States was a 
positive thing. Too much coordination and consideration for other policies could potentially 
hamper the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy that is being designed. To go ahead and 
implement policies that are working and working decently was thought to be better than to not 
implement anything in search for the perfect policy instrument. Such a search would only lead 
to paralysis and could cause more damage than good. It seems here that better coordination is 
more of a text-book solution which is harder to make real use of in reality, where for example 
theoretical notions of the importance of this factor are highlighted by del Río (2006). In this 
case would such coordination not diminish any effects of the interaction, partly since the EU 
level is already aware of the interaction problem and partly because such coordination would 
require a complete reformulation of the current policies. Better coordination in this case 
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would be to streamline the climate policies and make them more separate from the energy 
policies and let the EU ETS act on its own without any interference of the ECS and other 
RES-E support policies. Such streamlining would however require different goals to be set 
since the Renewables Directive is set separately by the EU and seems to be a target that has a 
strong political backing from within the EU regardless of its effects in Member States.    
 
 
V.III–Answering the research questions 
Providing the information collected and assessed above, an answer to the research questions 
of this thesis begins to emerge. However complex and circuitous the situation may seem, a 
pattern can be distinguished when answering the question: how is the interaction between the 
Swedish Electricity Certificate System and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
perceived in Sweden? Two standout findings occur, when the perception of the interaction 
resides in their inherent goal mishmash where some people perceive the ECS in part as a 
climate policy and some do not. This inherent distinction of the purpose of the instruments 
addresses the fact that there is a problem or not with the interaction; if it is a climate policy, 
then the effects of the interaction are negative and are not helping the climate cause, and if it 
is not a climate policy, it should not be judged to not deliver something it is not supposed to 
do. On the one hand, the persons working directly with the ECS within the Swedish public 
administration cite other reasons for the ECS to exist, such as diversification of supply, 
energy security and fulfilling the Swedish EU renewable energy goals. On the other hand, 
persons not working directly with the ECS but instead acting with the EU ETS or are 
standalone from either of the two policies persistently assert that this interaction is causing 
damage to the EU ETS as a climate policy and is not driving any carbon dioxide emission 
reductions. This is a very interesting finding due to the underlying understanding of the 
policies, which can by connected to both goal conflict and the intrinsic interests of the actors 
and how they respond to organizational translation of instruments’ goals and purposes. This 
creates a disparate view of the instruments and causes differentiated beliefs about the 
interaction problem. Since the impact of the interaction is not clearly established, the 
magnitude of the ECS effect on the EU ETS is not fully understood. This fact was repeatedly 
stated by several of the respondents, as well as that the sole size of the Swedish energy market 
is not significant enough to cause any actual effects. Due to the low demand on EU ETS 
allowances, the interaction’s effects are diminished even further which disables any 
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environmental benefit offsets brought up by scholars such as Brännlund (2011) and Vredin et 
al. (2011).  
   In the wake of the autonomous polity level discussion, a pattern emerges as the national 
sovereignty is decreased, but willingly so by membership in the EU, and thus decreases the 
chances for correcting any possible negative interactions. However, the different levels do not 
seem to be the cause of the interaction, partly due to the different goals of the supranational 
level where the EU both encourages the EU ETS and also incentivizes increased renewable 
energy production through its Renewables Directive (European Union, 2009a). This gives 
legitimacy for the ECS at the national level, and does in such not cause the interaction due to 
the autonomous levels acting with different and contradictory purposes. However, the 
autonomous levels in this case can make the interaction more resilient and harder to correct 
since neither have full authority over both polity levels in normal circumstances. These 
normal circumstances could however be altered if the EU would claim internal market reasons 
in order to be able to interfere with the Swedish ECS. As stated by one respondent, if Sweden 
has authority over one of the two interacting instruments the negative consequences can be 
corrected, but if this is not the case through internal market reasons – such as unfavorable or 
unjust market reasons –, the EU might gain full authority to intervene in any Swedish RES-E 
support policy. Whether this would be advantageous or not in correcting any possible 
interaction effect is not distinguishable. 
   Harmonization and coordination are the two elements (e.g., del Río, 2006) where remedies 
could be found to correct any such negative interaction effect. The appreciation of these two 
mechanisms are very much in line with the literature and can in appropriate terms be regarded 
as text-book solutions. To actually harmonize the support systems for renewable electricity 
production would be a feat not likely to happen due to divergent interests of the Member 
States. Creating better coordination between and within the polity levels could create more 
efficient and effective policies if handled correctly, but could also cause cluttering of policies 
that are over-worked and thus fail to deliver what they were supposed to do. By keeping the 
goals and the instruments separately, the goal focus is not lost and the effectiveness is more 
likely to be higher than if the utopian perfect policy instrument is designed and coordinated 
between and within different levels of governance in all eternity. 
   Summarily, the first research question on how the interaction is perceived gives 
nonidentical viewpoints of the effects and the impact, which comes down to the goal conflict 
of the two complimentary policies. The interaction is perceived differently by different 
people, depending on their understanding of the climate component in the policies and not the 
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energy component. It is safe to say that the interaction is complex enough to create these 
diverse opinions of impact assessment, goal orientation and how to best design climate and 
energy policies. 
   The second research question of this thesis – why the interaction problem is understood so 
differently – is closely tied to the first question of how it is perceived in Sweden. Evidently, 
the impact and the magnitude of the interaction are not yet established, and thus several 
theoretical assumptions are made without any real empirical claim. To establish a connection 
of the interaction effect and impact would require extensive research into European and 
Swedish energy and carbon market interactions and could potentially be very hard to isolate 
and distinguish. Assessing supranational and national policy interplay is complex in itself and 
does not by any means reside in a straightforward environment which would be needed to 
isolate one single effect. Social and political scientists repeatedly make up simplified 
normative models of how governance systems function, which could get consequences when 
analyzing the models due to one simple reason; there are always interactions! Due to this, 
interactions are bound to be understood differently since they are hard to distinguish. The 
international research community is not homogenous on the issue whether or not the 
interaction is problematic or not, nor what the actual impact or the real consequences may be. 
Therein can one explanation of the differing viewpoints lie since the TGCs are in many 
international contexts described as both an energy and a climate policy where the chief aim 
for spurring on more renewable electricity production is the carbon dioxide emission cuts that 
the TGC system may induced. However, in the case of Sweden, as expressed by most 
respondents, the ECS is not thought to be a climate policy and the reasons for adopting the 
instrument are not reasons that are tied to any carbon dioxide emission reductions. Since the 
Swedish gross electricity production is tantamount to carbon-free, there will be no carbon 
emissions reduction effect of any new additional influx of RES-E into the electricity mix. In 
addition, since renewable energy sources are readily available within Sweden – windy 
coastline, forests and land areas – the diversification of energy supply was best executed 
through renewables, and not with coal or gas which are not abundantly available in Sweden. 
Due to the TGC system being internationally regarded as a climate policy, whilst in Sweden 
the chief aim for the ECS does not relate to climate change mitigation, there are bound to be 
discrepancies about the understanding of the interaction of the ECS and the EU ETS. 
   Different opinions on the interaction and how it is understood are cause for concern since 
the two different goals of the instruments are in some ways connected but in some other ways 
contradictory. If the fulfillment of one policy causes negative impacts on another, then there is 
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definitely a problem of a negative interaction. If the effects of one policy are offset by the 
other, then that is most definitely a negative interaction as well. Despite this, if the impacts of 
those two interactions are not clearly defined there can be no one explanation of the 
interaction and thus will the viewpoints on it vary greatly. Summarily can it be noted that the 
problem is thought to be either a non-problem by some since the interaction is not evident to 
offset or impact the other policy instrument in any clear way, or by some that the interaction 
will in fact lead to more costly locked-in measures being taken for no apparent extra climate 
benefit however uncertain the impact is. Complimentary policies within the policy mix are 
intuitively supposed to create an enhanced effect than otherwise if the instruments were 
adopted in isolation. This, however, should not overshadow the fact that negative interactions 
can occur which will decrease the policy mix’s overall performance which must not be 
forgotten when designing overlapping policy instruments. 
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VI–Theoretical developments 
What, then, do stand out from the empirical findings between the interaction of the Electricity 
Certificate System (ECS) and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
where theoretical developments can be made out of?  What lessons can be learned? By 
conceptualizing the connections and contradictions of the empirical findings through the 
analysis of this thesis’s purpose and research questions, new theoretical notions can be 
generated in order to contribute to new research and knowledge on policy interplay, most 
importantly within multi-level policy instrument interactions and multiple policy instruments 
purposes and goal conflicts. These theoretical considerations can then be employed on other 
policy interactions. These contributes might, after being tested and scrutinized in different 
circumstances and situations, increase the awareness of policy interplay in general terms and 
furthermore deployed theoretically on other policy interactions. Two main concepts stand out 
of the empirical findings and the analysis and can be described in words of; multi-level policy 
instrument interactions, and; multiple policy instruments and goal conflicts.  
   The multi-level policy instrument interaction is evident when two policies interact from 
different polity levels. As noted earlier, a potential reason for the interaction to occur as it 
does is the interplay of two autonomous polity levels that can cause problems for managing 
two different interacting policies. However, this notion was not confirmed in the empirical 
findings and could thus not be said to hold true. What was instead found was that the two 
autonomous levels made the interaction worse in terms of managing it since no level had full 
authority of both instruments. This sparks ideas of multi-level governance theory that was 
developed in the 1990s by American scholars Gary Hooghe and Liesbet Marks on European 
Union cohesion policy (Bache, 2005, p. 5). The theory was described as “a system of 
continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks, 1993, p. 
392). Where supranational, national and local policy networks are intertwined (Marks, 1993, 
pp. 402–403), the multi-level governance process can be described as an ongoing “interplay 
between different autonomous entities without assigning sovereignty to any other of them” 
(Ederlein, Wälti & Zürn, 2010, p. 3) which seems to fit directly into the national sovereignty 
central concept brought up earlier in this study. What do not go unnoticed are the 
complications that arise within such a multi-level governance system that enmeshes the 
European Union and its Member States. When the sovereignty is divided upon several tiers of 
polity levels neither level will have full control of the entire policy process chain. 
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   One of the core principles of the multi-level governance theory is the notion of the growing 
interdependence of sub-national actors within the multi-tiered system (Bache & Flinders, 
2004, p. 3). This raises awareness for stakeholder intervention on policy design and 
formulation, especially when policies such as the EU ETS encompasses and affects so many 
different Member States, regions and actors. Due to the sub-national actors and the 
supranational level there are sentiments of a demise of the national state sovereignty. When so 
many stakeholders and polity levels are entrenched in the policy process of different policies, 
interactions are bound to happen, and policies are bound to affect different countries and 
actors with diverging institutions and social norms differently. “Does the concept of 
sovereignty need to be redefined?” (Ederlein, Wälti & Zürn, 2010, p. 2) is a viable question 
when assessing the national level’s authority over the policy process and its consequences. So 
how does the interaction express itself in this ‘new’ multi-level governance environment? 
Harmonization is, as stated several times before, traditionally mentioned as a possible remedy, 
but the mere existence of the different polity levels within the European Union are potential 
stumble blocks for harmonizing any policies over all Member States. The consensus of 
harmonization would be hard to reach within the EU because it is unclear whether it is 
politically feasible, and if it were, it remains uncertain to which level policies should be 
harmonized. Consequently, the policy interactions within multiple polity-level systems seem 
to be a result of a constantly globalizing world, where international conventions and policies 
conducted at the supranational level require policy processes to go through several tiers of 
governance systems. An interaction situation is therefore destined to occur when complex 
systems of governance levels operate different policies at different levels.  
   The multiple policy instruments and goal conflicts concept of the findings that can be 
theorized reside in the multiple purposes of the two interacting policy instruments. When two 
policies interact negatively, the individual purposes of the policies must first be analyzed to 
see whether a goal conflict is eminent. On this matter, the findings of this study show that the 
goal of the ECS is to increase the production of electricity from renewable energy sources 
(RES-E), whilst the goal of the EU ETS is to cap, and eventually reduce, total carbon dioxide 
emissions. That is all well and good, but the purposes of these goals come together when the 
reasons for adopting them interact. If a greater share of renewable energy is included in the 
gross energy mix of a Member State, that greater share will affect the carbon dioxide 
emissions and thus affect the goal of the EU ETS. The purpose of promoting increased RES-E 
production must be sorted out – whether it is mainly due to energy diversification or carbon 
dioxide emission reductions – since the two goals could otherwise interfere. In the empirical 
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findings, Sweden’s purpose of promoting RES-E production through the ECS was however 
not for carbon dioxide emissions reduction reasons, but for other reasons such as 
diversification of supply and increased energy security. These findings raise notions of 
conflict theory (e.g., Lebow, 1981) when the EU’s reasons for promoting increased RES-E 
production are chiefly for the cuts in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions it delivers (see 
European Union, 2009a) as contradictory to the Swedish reasons of adopting the ECS. The 
conflict here, where entity A thinks of B in another way than B thinks of B, and vice versa, 
can also be transferred over to the fact of the discrepancies regarding whether the ECS is a 
climate policy or not as seen from a Swedish perspective and shown in the empirical findings. 
There are clear indications of that there are conflicts over the purposes of the instruments and 
whether they interact or not. Goal conflict scenarios have been studied in academics by 
organizational theorists where complex conflicting goals settings attached to goal difficulty 
might hamper productiveness and cause unwanted effects (e.g., Locke, Smith, Erez, Chuh & 
Schaffer, 1994; Slocum, Cron & Brown, 2002; Kehr, 2003; Cheng, Luckett & Mahama, 
2007). This can indicate signs of debilitating the overall purpose of either of the interacting 
instruments. 
   The other sides of the goal conflict scenario are multiple policy instruments for multiple 
goals. In Stavins’ (2010) example of the U.S. Acid Rain cap-and-trade program where two 
policies were used for two different goals – acid rain and displaced miners due to the high 
levels of sulfur in Appalachian coal mines –, $1 billion dollar were perpetually saved from the 
economy due to the multiple instruments used instead of one single instrument that sought to 
address two different problems. The distinction here is how, and for what reasons, the two 
goals should be addressed. The EU ETS seeks to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and the 
ECS seeks to increase RES-E production. Since it is hard to kill two birds with one stone, 
multiple instruments are sometimes needed, but might come at a cost of complimentary policy 
interplay. It was mentioned by the respondents that the ECS’s interaction with the EU ETS 
can cause higher aggregate abatement costs, and that fact remains true for all complimentary 
policies that interfere with the EU ETS such as energy efficiency measures, feed-in tariffs and 
energy and carbon taxes. Thus, whenever politicians pursue two different goals, two different 
policy instruments to address them is usually the best viable option. However, the goal 
combination must also be assessed over the reasons for adopting the two goals. If the goals 
are interfering and causing negative interaction effects, there might be a need for a single 
policy to address a single problem, namely carbon dioxide emission cuts.  
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   The Swedish ECS seems to be exempt from this goal combination disorder since the reasons 
from as Swedish perspective for adopting the ECS was not to decrease carbon dioxide 
emissions, but to increase diversification of supply, energy security and to fulfill EU 
legislation of new RES-E production. What becomes evident is the goal combination paradox 
that the European Union then has to tackle, where the union’s goals are mirrored by the 
Member States who have significant leeway in how to reach the goals which can create side 
effects for other policy instruments. Coordination arises as the general solution to such 
multiple goal combination policies where the EU has to coordinate the policy interplay not 
only between the supranational level and Member States on the national level but also within 
its domains – carbon dioxide reductions and increased RES-E production – so that the goals 
are reached as cost-effectively as possible.  
    Summarily, what can be described as a demise of the national sovereignty affects the 
authority over policy formulation and implementation exerted by Member States in the 
European Union. When so many stakeholders, Member States, interests and polity levels are 
intertwined, policy interactions are prone to take place. This national authority decrease has 
however not been found to be the reason for any policy interactions to appear, but may cause 
the interaction to be more resilient and make it harder to correct. Harmonization is a viable 
path to head down if interactions are to be eliminated, but when enmeshed in complex multi-
level governance systems the task of harmonizing the rules for all Member States becomes 
increasingly harder. In addition, as mentioned, having two policy goals often requires two 
policy instruments, but when the reasons for adopting the two goals are connected, chances 
are slim that any interaction effects would fail to occur. The reasons for adopting the policy 
goals must be developed in coordination so that no negative interactions take place. As the 
supranational level formulates overarching policy goals, these goals can affect different 
nations and institutions differently and might cause concern for reasons to adopt adequate 
measures. As in the case with the ECS, since the adoption of the instrument was not tied to 
carbon dioxide emission cuts, the main reason for the Renewable Directive (European Union, 
2009a) goal from the supranational level was thus overthrown. If two policies are needed for 
one goal, the incentive of the individual purposes of them must be thoroughly motivated and 
communicated so as to diminish conflict paradoxes of the respective instruments’ goals and 
purposes, such as advances for renewables  and new ‘green technologies’ as contra to only 
supporting a carbon dioxide pricing market. As within this study’s example can the effect of 
all complimentary support policies for renewable energy and energy efficiency in the 
European Union have an incremental effect on allowance prices of the EU ETS and thus 
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negatively impact the carbon dioxide emissions price. This would in turn create higher 
aggregated abatement costs for the consumers who are unaware of any interacting policies 
that they will have to pay for. By separating the policy instruments and the goals and purposes 
of national and supranational policies, interactions might thus be decreased and not negatively 
affect the effectiveness of the instruments and the overall performance of the policy mix. 
.   
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VII–Conclusion 
In accordance with the previous research on the interaction between policy instruments and 
particularly on the interaction between renewable energy promotion and carbon emission 
reduction systems, this study shows many different understandings of the interaction. 
However, since the research is solely conducted from a Swedish perspective, some elements 
are of special note for the research community to which this study can contribute.  
   The conclusions of this study are drawn from the research questions and the generated 
theoretical conceptions. Firstly, the empirical findings of the thesis set out to answer how the 
interaction between the Swedish Electricity Certificate System (ECS) and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is perceived from the Swedish perspective. The 
findings gave several viewpoints on the interaction and the respondents varied greatly in their 
answers. Most notably did the respondents agreed on that there is a theoretical interaction, but 
whether it poses an empirical problem or not is unclear. In essence, the understanding whether 
the ECS is a climate policy or not determines whether the interaction is perceived as a 
problem or not. Where one faction of the respondents argues that the ECS was not adopted for 
carbon dioxide emission reduction reasons but instead due to diversification of supply, 
increased energy security and to fulfill the EU’s Renewables Directive, the other side argued 
that the climate component in the ECS still negatively interferes on the EU ETS allowance 
price. This goal conflict resembles a failure of translating organizational goals of how to 
perceive the instrument’s overall purpose: whether as a climate policy or not. Since the two 
factions were dominantly on either side of the energy and climate policy sphere, the intrinsic 
emotional interests of the two different factions might be the reason for them to understand 
the policy differently. The interaction impact was however predominantly perceived to be a 
non-problem since the magnitude of the effects is uncertain and presumably negligible. Thus, 
the interaction between the ECS and the EU ETS exists, but discrepancies arise about its 
impact and whether it is a problem or not since insufficient empirical research has been 
carried out on the magnitudes of the effect. Harmonization and coordination are potential 
remedies for negative interaction effects but can be said to be more of text-book solutions 
whilst harder to implement in reality due to dissimilar views on to what level and how to 
design the harmonized instrument and for an actual will to better coordinate through and 
within polity levels without creating too cluttered instruments that fails to reach their targets. 
   Secondly, the question of why the interaction problem is perceived so differently is closely 
related to the first question since the different perceptions of the interaction mirror the reasons 
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for it to be understood so differently. Since the increased electricity from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E) production on EU and international level is chiefly related to climate change 
mitigation, the understandings of the Swedish ECS policy will evidently hold different people 
to believe that to be one of the purposes of the instrument and the understanding of the 
interaction will therefore vary accordingly. However the ECS policy is understood, the 
theoretical effects of the interaction might still undermine the EU ETS prices and create 
increased aggregate abatement costs put on the consumers for no apparent reason due to 
locked-in measures. The goal conflict arises here when the purposes of the instruments are 
related but not thought to be directly linked – namely increased RES-E production and carbon 
dioxide emission reductions. What the reasons are for adopting these policies is however the 
main driver of whether the purposes are interlinked or not. The interaction is theoretically 
factual but not empirically assessed and since the impact is uncertain the viewpoints on the 
problem will be disparate as well. 
   The theoretical developments of the thesis take hold of the concepts of multi-level 
governance systems within the autonomous polity levels where the interacting policies reside. 
The national sovereignty over policy formulation and implementation has been limited due to 
sub-national and supranational interests and various actors and stakeholders that will decrease 
national sovereignty and can thus create complimentary policies since the authority is moved 
away from the national level. This was found to not be a significant reason for the interaction 
to occur, but might make it harder to correct via coordination and harmonization of policy 
instruments on different levels. In addition, policy goal conflicts take place when multiple 
polity-levels formulate multiple policies for multiple goals. The reason for adopting the 
policies need to be sufficiently developed in coordination with other policies and might need 
multiple policies to be effectively and efficiently fulfilled. If different policy goals are 
pursued, two or more policies might be the best option if the purposes are differentiated and 
not connected. However, if the two policies’ overall purposes are intertwined in the policy 
mix, interactions are bound to happen that can create negative effects on either of the two 
policies, and thence might decrease the overall performance of the instruments. 
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VII.I–Discussion 
Based on the conclusions of this study, the empirical findings, analysis and theoretical 
developments, what is there to learn from these results? At first, differences between various 
support policies for renewable electricity highlight the importance of a national context of 
understanding different interacting policies. The Swedish ECS had different reasons for being 
adopted as compared to what other countries in the European Union might have had for other 
RES-E support policies. The importance of looking at policy formulations and implications 
from different perspectives is evident when the reasons for adopting the policies vary. This is 
especially true when RES-E production support policies are implemented in an already 
crowded policy space where several instruments are thought to perform effectively and 
efficiently towards one or several targets. In this way, interactions are very likely to occur and 
the complimentary policies, for which the reason to adopt them are more obscure, can carry 
over effects to the policy mix – both negatively and positively.  
   One way of trying to solve these issues is to streamline the climate and energy policies and 
make them more standalone. However, climate and energy issues are tightly connected and 
policies have to be intertwined in the policy mix in some way in order to create the positive 
incentives needed to spur on climate change mitigation, technological developments and still 
maintain a healthy and competitive industry sector. If the main policy driver is deemed not 
adequate enough to create the incentives needed, then complimentary policies might be 
needed. This must however be communicated and motivated sufficiently so that any 
interaction can be legitimately justified. In addition, the details of the EU ETS cap are in 
desperate need of being adjusted. If the overall purpose of the cap-and-trade system is to 
create a price for carbon dioxide emissions then the price level needs to be in accordance with 
the scope of the EU ETS target and effectively decreasing carbon dioxide emissions. As 
mentioned throughout the empirical findings, the EU ETS cap is set too high, and the price for 
the allowances is much too low to create sufficient incentives to invest in carbon-neutral 
technologies. A low allowance price level must not per se be described as problematic since it 
only reflects low marginal abatement costs where carbon dioxide emission reduction 
measures are effective and efficient. If the emissions are under the cap, the goal is reached 
and low prices reflect low costs for the society. This holds true, but only so when the level of 
the cap is taking countries where they want to go. As of now, the carbon dioxide emissions 
will only be reduced by roughly 70% until 2050 which is not sufficient enough to reach 
overall climate targets such as the Copenhagen Accord (UNFCCC, 2009, p. 5). Therefore, the 
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EU needs to tighten up the cap of the EU ETS to create a main incentives driver through a 
cap-and-trade system. Another measure that can be taken is to create a price floor of the 
allowance prices which would guarantee a minimum price which the industry can adhere to 
and use in its planning horizons. Also, a price ceiling, or yet even a price collar – price floor 
and ceiling combined –, could be put upon the system to increase the incentives for firms to 
invest in new technologies. This is necessary since reaching the climate targets regardless of 
the cap of the EU ETS is globally inescapable. If the superior goal is to reduce the carbon 
dioxide emissions cost-effectively then one policy instrument would be the best choice. Alas, 
if there are two goals, one to decrease carbon dioxide emissions and one to specifically 
increase RES-E production, two policies are needed that will most likely interfere with each 
other and create an interaction effect however uncertain the impact is within the policy mix. 
   To conclude, four policy recommendations summarize the findings that can be of use for 
policy makers at both national and supranational level when determining how to combine 
renewable electricity support systems with carbon dioxide reduction systems.  
 
♦ One instrument for one problem, two instruments for two problems. If carbon 
dioxide emission reductions are the only goal, one policy will most likely be the best 
viable choice. However, if two goals are to be attained, both carbon dioxide 
reduction and increased production of RES-E, then two policies are highly desirable. 
 
♦ The reasons for deploying different policies must be sufficiently communicated 
and motivated in order to create legitimate instruments. If the reason for adopting a 
Tradable Green Certificate system is not to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, 
communicating the real reasons – energy security, diversification of supply or 
fulfillment of supranational targets – are imperative to avoid unjustified criticism.  
 
♦ Avoid overlapping instruments whenever the purposes are the same. Although the 
interaction’s impact is negligible, the shadow costs will be more difficult to 
determine and subsequently will the efficiency of the policies be highly uncertain. 
Since one policy might ‘pay’ for the other, the policies must be coordinated and 
harmonized accordingly so that both objectives are reached at the lowest costs 
possible within the policy mix. 
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♦ Supranational targets must take into account different national settings. A target set 
at EU level can induce similar types of policies in different countries, such as RES-E 
support policies, whilst the outcome of the EU target might not be the same in all 
Member States. This can cause higher aggregate costs which could have been 
avoided if the EU targets were set more appropriately for different Member States. A 
more rigid design of an Emissions Trading System such as the EU ETS – with 
mechanisms such as price floor, ceiling or collar – could provide enough incentives 
to invest so that complimentary policies are not needed which consequently can 
eradicate potential negative effects of interacting policy instruments.  
 
 
VII.II–Further research 
Several viable topics for further research on the subject could be of relevance, and especially 
other examples of the perceptions of other countries understanding of the interaction. Since 
this thesis is set out from the Swedish perspective, an analysis of other countries with 
renewable energy support policies that could interfere with the EU ETS is likely to broaden 
the knowledge on the matter. Since changes in the EU ETS legislation will take effect in 
Phase III from 2013 onwards, these effects could also be assessed in order to see whether they 
change anything regarding the interaction effect. Auctioning of EU ETS allowances could 
possibly mitigate the trading effect that takes place when renewable energy offsets emission 
allowances in one country that can be emitted in another country. However, the effects on the 
interaction of the changes during the EU ETS Phase III are as of now uncertain and more 
research is needed. 
   Another possible dimension of the interaction effect could be to include a more political 
dimension within the scope of the study, where politicians and not only policymakers are 
included in the data collection. This could presumably highlight other factors that cause 
complimentary policies to be adopted and might give a better overall comprehension of the 
democratic sphere of policymaking. Additional effects of the interaction, such as effects on 
energy security, competitiveness and energy poverty as outlined in the EU’s core principles 
for EU energy policy – as laid down in the Lisbon Treaty Article 194 (European Union, 2008) 
– might further highlight the policy mix’s overall outcome. This is highly relevant from a 
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political science perspective where the economic consequences of a negative interaction 
might cause effects to other institutions and human welfare.  
   The most important research that still has to be conducted is the impact assessment of the 
interacting policies as numerous scholars have concluded before, and there is no reason that 
this does not hold valid as of this date. Despite the difficulty of isolating the effects of 
interacting policies in an EU-wide carbon allowance market, research will have to be 
conducted if the magnitude and the gravity of the impact of complimentary supranational and 
national policy interplay are ever to be understood. The impact assessment however appears 
to be a winding and thorny research path for a political scientist and might best be left to 
better equipped economists to deal with. 
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Appendix A 
Interview guide 
Note that the order of the questions does not necessarily reflect the sequence during the 
interviews. The exact phrasing might also not have been used. Follow-up questions were 
asked and the respondent’s where encouraged to elaborate on their key notions.   
 
Perception of problem 
♦ Is there an interaction between the Electricity Certificate System and the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme?  
♦ What are the consequences, and is it a problematic issue? 
 
For example: 
♦ Will the interaction offset the environmental benefits of the Electricity Certificate due 
to the emissions trading within the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme? 
♦ Will the interaction increase the price of reaching the emission targets? 
♦ Will the interaction “serve the dirtiest”, as in when the most carbon-emitting 
technologies are benefited since the shadow cost of the emissions constraint is decreased 
due to the Electricity Certificate System?  
♦ Will the interaction undermine the Electricity Certificate market and cause a higher 
pricing of renewable electricity? 
♦ Are there other effects associated with the interaction? 
♦ Will the interaction cause any positive or negative synergies? 
 
Effectiveness 
Electricity Certificate System 
♦ What do you think of the Electricity Certificate System as a means to increase the 
production of electricity from renewable energy sources? 
♦ What do you think of the Electricity Certificate System as a means to decrease overall 
carbon dioxide emissions from Swedish electricity production?  
♦ Do you think that the Electricity Certificate System will be developed further in the future? 
♦ Are there other policy instruments that would be better in order to increase the production of 
electricity from renewable energy sources than the Electricity Certificate System? 
FILIP EHRLE ELVELING, 2012 
77 
 
♦ Are there other policy instruments that would be better in order to decrease the carbon 
dioxide emissions more than the Electricity Certificate System? 
 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
♦ What do you think of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as a means to 
decrease carbon dioxide emissions within Sweden and the European Union?  
♦ Do you think that the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme will be developed further 
in the future? 
♦ Are there other policy instruments that would be better in order to decrease the carbon 
dioxide emissions more than the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme? 
♦ Are there any problems with the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme in regards to 
decreasing carbon dioxide emissions? 
 
National sovereignty 
♦ Is the Swedish sovereignty (national level) of policy formulation and implementation 
threatened due to the European Union (supranational level)?  
♦ Are there signs that the Swedish authority (national level) in terms of correcting any 
negative effects of the interconnection is diminishing due to the autonomous European Union 
(supranational level)?  
♦ Is it desirable from a Swedish perspective to have a pan-European Electricity Certificate 
System?  
 
Harmonization and coordination  
♦ Is there a need for harmonization of the Electricity Certificate System on a supranational 
level to minimize the negative interaction effects or maximize positive interaction effects? 
♦ Do you believe that the total electricity produced from renewable energy sources would be 
increased if there were a pan-European Union Electricity Certificate System? 
♦ Do you believe that carbon dioxide emissions would be reduced further if there were a pan-
European Union Electricity Certificate System? 
♦ Is there a need for better policy coordination between the supranational level of the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme and the national level of Electricity Certificate 
System to minimize possible negative interaction effects or maximize positive interaction 
effects?  
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Appendix C 
Table 9. ECS quotas and forecasted production 
Quotas for the period 2003–2035 with forecasted accumulated new renewable 
electricity production and actual accumulated new renewable electricity production. 
 
Year Quota [%] 
Forecasted RES-E 
production 
(accum.) [TWh] 
Actual new RES-E 
production 
(accum. increase) 
[TWh] 
2003 7.4 
 
1.96 
2004 8.1 – 4.55 
2004 10.4 – 4.80 
2006 12.6 – 5.66 
2007 15.1 – 6.76 
2008 16.3 – 8.54 
2009 17.0 9.31 9.07 
2010 17.9 10.81 11.55 
2011 17.9 11.84 
 2012 17.9 12.94 
 2013 13.5 14.80 
 2014 14.2 16.26 
 2015 14.3 17.71 
 2016 14.4 19.17 
 2017 15.2 20.63 
 2018 16.8 22.09 
 2019 18.1 23.54 
 2020 19.5 25.00 
 2021 19.0 25.00 
 2022 18.0 25.00 
 2023 17.0 25.00 
 2024 16.1 25.00 
 2025 14.9 25.00 
 2026 13.7 25.00 
 2027 12.4 25.00 
 2028 10.7 25.00 
 2029 9.2 25.00 
 2030 7.6 25.00 
 2031 6.1 25.00 
 2032 4.5 25.00 
 2033 2.8 25.00 
 2034 1.2 25.00 
 2035 0.8 25.00 
 Source: Reworked from Swedish Energy Agency (2011a), p. 15  
